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The problem of nuclear control v/ithin MATO has
created sharply divergent state views, policies, and
actions.' The United States proposed the concept of the
Multilateral Force (MLF) in response to and as an attempted
solution to the problems that developed over the control
issue.
The thesis examines the interrelated issv-ies of lack
of consensus on Alliance strategy, credibility of the
deterrent, and the matter of proliferation as they relate
to the overall problem of nuclear control. The reactions
of the principal European powers are also investigated to
determine the im.plications of the MLF policy.
The thesis concludes that the issues over nuclear
control remain and that the J-ILF proposal instead of giving
cohesiveness to the Alliance managed to create a certain
disharmony. The J.ILF concept is now in a state of
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The problem of nuclear control v/ithin the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization has developed over the last
decade creating sharply divergent state views, policies,
and actions. The Multilateral Force (conunonly referred to
as MLF) , which the United States proposed in an effort to
restore cohesion to the Atlantic Alliance, emerged instead
as a controversial issue. One, but by no raeans sole result
was that relations betv/een the United States and the
European Powers caiae into conflict.
A debate developed betv/een America and Western Europe
over the strategy and control of nuclear v/eapons within NATO
which involved all of the countries within the Alliance.
Each nation has issued elaborate policy statements to support
its position and theories. Scholars, editors, and statesmen
have joined in the examination of the problem to the point
that the material available on the subject is overwhelming.
Still the problems remain, and since the dispute directly
affects the political future of Europe as well as its
security, and the United States position in direct relation-
ship to the Atlantic Community, the candidate felt the need
for further study in order to understand the complexities of
the situation. At the same time, the hope is raised that a
small contribution to the extensive material already in

2existence can be made, since the probleia of relations
between the United States and Europe with respect to nuclear
control within NATO is one of major importance.
The safety of the United States depends on the
security, prosperity, and solidarity of the Western Alliance
and in turn the security and prosperity of V,'estern Europe
depends on the strength and will of the United States. NATO
was formed on mutual dependence against a common threat to
increase security and assist in restorin<^ vitality to
V.'estern Europe. However, with the return of prosperity and
with the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles,
Europe has wanted a say in the control over its destiny.
The United States designed the MLF to meet the
requirement over the control issue and to act as an alter-
native to the development of individual nuclear forces. The
hope was to provide a framework which would meet the demands
of the NATO countries, in particular Y.'est Germany, and there-
by create a greater cohesiveness within the Atlantic
Alliance.
The control problem has been present in NATO ever
since nuclear weapons were first introduced as a key element
in the defense of IVestern Europe in 1954. Since that time,
three major problem areas have developed in NATO to which
MLF evolved as an attempted response. The first, and funda-
mental problem, from which the other tv/o deri^/e, is the lack
of a basic strategic consensus. This is certainly not a new

3problem but one which has come into clearer focus as Yi'estern
Europe developed self-sufficiency and the Soviet Union broke
the nuclear monopoly. The secoiid, is the question of credi-
bility of the deterrent, which has become the center of
debate in V/estei'n circles and an important factor in
examining various strategies and weapons systems. Finally,
of major concern is the matter of proliferation, which is a
logical outcome to no agreement on strategy and serious
doubts as to credibility.
These interrelated issues will be examined in the
follov/ing pages by referring to speeches and writings of
responsible officials entrusted with making foreign policy
statements for both the United States, France and other key
countries. The first chapter develops the histOi'y of the
MLF. Next, the French position on nuclear matters and
independence of action are examined. In the following-
chapter the policy of the United States is investigated.
The fifth chapter looks at the positions of the Federal
Republic of Germany, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.
Chapter Six attempts to summarize the overall central
problem of nuclear control and the matter of proliferation.
Since the major research for the paper covered a time frame
up to the end of 1965, an attempt has been made in an
epilogue to update the thesis to July, 1966, in order to
cover the major event of the French withdrawal from NATO.

The actions of France, once again, have caused the
NATO- countries to shift their iimaediate attention away from
the problems which serve as a basis and are key to the
control issue facing NATO; problems which must be solved if





ORIGIN AND CONCEPT OF MLF
A Background History
In laying the basis for the multilateral nuclear
force (MLF), there is the necessity to return to the dawn
of the missile age in 1957. In July of that year, the
United States announced plans to establish nuclear arras
stockpiles in Europe for use by NATO armies and to sell
interiaedia te-range missiles to Britain..
The motivation behind this move was strategic as well
as political. The Soviet Union, by this time, was known to
have intermediate-range missiles which could destroy key
NATO bases. Although tactical nuclear v/eapons were in NATO
under strict United States control, strategic weapons to
oppose the Soviet force had not been installed. Political
pressure had been mounting within NATO over the control of
tactical weapons because ^A'estern Europe felt a certain
hostageship to the United States monopoly which could lead
to a nuclear exchange in Europe.
The fear that the United States might recklessly
cause Europe's annihilation soon took a reverse cast with
the advent of the Soviet Union's Sputnik. In October 1957,
the successful launching of the earth satellites symbolized
•The New York Times, July 17, 1957.

6the creation of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Now the allies had a contradictory but significant
fear that the United States might flinch at using nuclear
weapons in the defense of Europe. They felt that American
cities would be the target of Soviet retaliation and this
would prevent the United States from using nuclear weapons
in the defense of Europe.
In order to allay Europe's fears, President Eisenhower
attended the NATO meetings in Paris in December, 1957 and
assured the allies that Araerica would cone to their defense.
At the North Atlantic Council meeting. Secretary I>jlles
presented a plan to disperse Intermediate Range Ballistic
Missiles (IRBM's) and nuclear stockpiles in Europe with the
assurance that the decision to use the missiles v/ould be a
2bilateral arrangement.
The plan was approved, permitting the United States
to execute bilateral agreements with its allies to place
IRBM's on allied soil in accordance with NATO plans. The
decision to use the missiles v/as to be a joint one, with the
ally controlling the missile -and the United States control-
ling the nuclear warhead, which in effect, gave both a veto.
In addition, stocks of nuclear warheads for both strategic
and tactical nuclear weapons were to be dispersed in places
accessible in the event of war, under the custody of the
2The New York Times, December 17, 1957.

Supreme Allied Coiiiraander in Europe acting in the capacity
3
as an American Coimaauder in Chief, Europe (CINCEUii.)
Britain agreed to the IRBM offer and Thor missiles
were placed there under a two-key system in 195o. Authoriza-
tion by both Great Britain and the United States was
required to join the warhead to the missile and fire it.
Jupiter I.IDM's were accepted by Italy and Turkey in 1953 in
similar a^i'eer.ients . France refused to accept any missiles
4
or warneads unless she could have control of both.
The refusal of France to accept bilateral control of
missiles emphasized the issue that Europe wanted a greater
share in the operation of the NATO nuclear capability.
Concern was voiced that if the United States did not grant
her allies a greater share in control of weapons, they would
either seek neutrality or proceed to develop their own
nuclear force. Either case would affect the security of
the United States and NATO by diluting the cohesion of the
alliance
.
France accepted the alternative of developing her
own nuclear force, declaring, she would proceed with or with-
out United States assistance. Further, she would proceed
despite a nuclear test ban, formal or informal, as she was
3
ilobert E. Osgood, NATO The Entangling Alliance
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press , iyoL')





8deterinined to become a nuclear pov/er, at least equal to
Great Britain, even though the United States was openly
committed to developing a nuclear test ban and desirous of
halting the spread of nuclear v/eapons. The French action
only created increased pressure on the United States by its
allies for greater control over nuclear weapons as an
effective alternative to independent forces. The prospect
of other nations following the French example v/as very
real. In August, 1959 a solution to the problem was pro-
posed by General Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander in
Europe (SACSUtl), in a speech calling foi the establishment
of NATO as a "fourth nuclear pov;er" with its own control
5
over nuclear weapons. The missiles were to be of medium
range (MRBM) v/ith a range of about twelve hundred miles to
meet NATO's tactical requirements. General Norstad sub-
sequently indicated he had in mind a multinational operation
6
of landbased Polaris missiles to replace outmoded aircraft.
In February, 1960, France exploded her first test
nuclear bomb which led to further proposals over the
problem of control. In March, General Norstad proposed a
multinational unit to be composed initially of the United






Robert S. Osgood, Nuclear Control in NATO. (''^Wash-
ington: Vi'ashington Center of Foreign Poli"cy .research,
1962), p. 2.

9to be an American. The United States supported the plan but
re-emphasized the condition that the nuclear v/arhead must
remain under American control, a stipulatron which made
7
acceptance unlikely.
However, some system was needed to replace the slow-
to-fire and very vulnerable rhor and Jupiter missiles
installed in Europe as a counter-balance to Soviet lilHI.I's.
A formula for nuclear control was needed that would satisfy
Congress and yet be equally acceptable to the Allies.
Further, it must satisfy other countries fearful of the
spread of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union had threatened
the United States that she would consider giving her allies
nuclear weapons if controls were released by the United
8
States. Despite the pressure, continued proposals were
suggested in an effort to set up an integrated allied force.
Secretai'y of Defense Gates, in April, 19G0, proposed
the deployment of Polaris missiles on barges and f la tears
and suggested a modification to the dual-control system,
giving the decision to join the missile and warhead to the
Supreme Commander of NATO. pe Gaulle, however, would not
7The Nev/ York Times, March 3, 1960. General Norstad
reiterated tne proposTTl of NATO having a nuclear capacity of
its own before the Sixth NATO Parliamentarians' Conference
in November 1960. See United States Congress, Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. Sixth NATO Parliamentarians '
Conference . S7th Congress, 1st Session C'^shington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1961), p. 2.
^Ibid. March 20, 1960
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accept the plan unless one-third of the Polaris installations
9
were given to France for her control with her own warheads.
The plan was dropped because the United States desired to
put part of the installations in France, but not under sole
French control. French opposition led to a new proposal
which would not be dependent on French soil.
The State Department developed the Bov/ie plan which
was to become a Nx\TO de,terrent under NATO command. This
plan, authored by Hobert R. Bowie, then Director of the
Harvard Center for International Affairs, consisted of two
major parts: (1) a fleet of Polaris submarines that would
utilize multinational crews, and in addition land-type
Polaris missiles; (2) a conventional force buildup was to
take place which would provide for the conventional defense
of Europe.
The Bowie plan is probably the true predecessor of
MLF. The first part developed the ideas of multinational
crews for a seaborne deterrent. The second part of the plan
appeared to call for a change in strategy by emphasizing a
conventional buildup. The control issue was to be settled
by each country having a veto over the use of the force
—
unanimity was required to place the force in motion. The
Soviet Union attacked the idea of NATO becoming a nuclear
9




The New York Times, October 13, 1960.
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power as a scheme to prevent disarmament talks and peace.
At the NATO Council meeting in Paris in December 1960,
Secretary of State Plerter advanced a modified Bowie plan
proposal for a NATO controlled MRBM force which was to be
composed of five ballistic missile submarines. In addition,
the concept was to include the purchase by the allies of
one hundred more missiles to be placed on other ships under
NATO control. Hov/ever,- the package was conditional in that
it required the allies to agree to a "multilateral system"
of political control, and Secretary Herter pointed out that
Congress would have to approve any arrangement made for such
a force.
The conditional nature of the proposal coupled with the
problem of v/orking out a multilateral system of control tended
to minimize interest in the proposition, and it consequently
met with a cool reception in every country except Germany
and Italy. A change in the administration at this point
also had an influence on non-acceptance as it v/as realized
that the outgoing Eisenhower administration could not commit
the incoming Kennedy administration to any such plan. The
NATO Council noted the proposal and agreed to study the






Ibid., December 17, 1960.
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13firmer proposals by the new adrainis tration. One of the
first moves made by the new Kennedy administration was to
set up an informal commission of inquiry headed by
Dean Acheson. The Achobon Comiaittee examined the merits of
the schemes proposed to strengthen NATO under the laulti-
national concept as opposed to a multilateral comT^oaent with-
in the alliance. Rand Corporation's Albert V.'ohlstetter
headed up the multinational proposal and Professor Eo\.'ie
14
the multilateral study. It appears that certain facets of
both concepts won out as the Kennedy administration adopted
the original proposals made by Secretary Herter.
The President announced in May, 19G1 at Ottav/a "...
the possibility of eventually establishing a NATO seaborne
missile force which would be truly multilateral in owiier-
ship and control, if this should be desired and found
feasible by our allies once NATO non-nuclear goals have been
15
achieved." In this speech, President Kennedy reiterated
the Un.ited States offer of five Polaris submarines, but
there was no specific mention of the 100 missiles which
Secretary Herter had proposed. Conditions again appeared





Alastair Buchan, The Multilateral Force: An
His torical Perspective (Londonl The Ins ci cute f or^Strategic
Studies , AdelpnT Papers, Number Thirteen, October, 1964),
p. 5.
15
The New York Times, May IS, 19G1.
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non-nuclear goals. This indicated that the Kennedy adminis-
tration accopted the Dov/ie Plan but raade its second part a
precondition to the creation of a NATO nuclear force.
The following year at the Athens Ministers' meeting,
the United States announced the assigniaont of five Polaris
submarines to NATO's Suprene Allied Conimander Atlantic,
(SACLANT) . However, NATO v/as v/ell aware that the assignment
did not affect political control of the vessels since they
v/ould be manned by Araerican crews which could only fire on
order of the President. The communique that v/as issued
shov/ed agreement had been reached to set up special procedures
for the exchange of information. There was also a notice-
able effort on the part of Secretary of Defense WcNamara to
impress the Allied Ministers with United States nuclear
supremacy in hopes of discouraging independent forces and
dispelling fears of any missile gap. It was also a prelude
to United States concerted effort to build up NATO's
conventional forces.
The famous June 16, 1932, Ann Arbor speech by the
United States Defense Secretary was another call for the
buildup of conventional strength. To support a new American
strategy of "controlled response," McNamara stated that the
Alliance had overall nuclear strength adequate to meet any
challenge confronting it. He attacked small and independent
16 Ibid. , May 7, 1962.

14
national forces, proclaiming them "dangerous, expensive,
prone to obsolescense, and lacking in credibility as a
1 7deterrent." McNamara also tried to inject further confidence
in the American will to protect NATO by declaring that "the
United States had undertaken the nuclear defense of NATO on
a global basis. "^^ No mention was made of a NATO nuclear
force and there was a strong, immediate reaction to the
speech in Y/estern Europe,, especially by Britain.
Pressure continued to mount for an alternative to
national forces. General Norstad, Chancellor Adenauer,
Germany's Defense Minister Strauss, and NATO Secretary
General Stikker, continued to advocate and had become in-
sistent on a NATO nuclear force, -^^ This led the Aiaerican
government to study actively, elaborate, and explore with
key allies, a concrete plan developed in the Navy, for a
fleet of surface vessels to carry Polaris under joint
control of NATO and be operated by a multinational crew.
Added stimulus was created by the Cuban missile
crisis of October, 1962. President De Gaulle's determination
^"^Ibid.
,
June 17, 1952. Text of Ann Arbor speech by
Secretary of~Defense Robert S. McNamara.
ISibid.
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to continue his force de frappe, and his drive for leader-
ship of the Etirope he envisions, provided further pressures.
De Gaulle saw ov/nership of nuclear weapons as the great
equalizer and, according to Ronald Steel, Europeans learned
two crucial lessons from the Cuban missile crisis:
The first v/as that the United States was ready to
risk the nuclear obliteratioi of its Allies in defense
of Aiiierican interests, although the United States would
not allov/ itself to be drav/n into danger in defense of
European interests—as its actions in the Suez landings
demcnstratedo The second lesson was that the two
nuclear giants would ii.ipose v/hatever settleir.ent they
sav/ fit V-po^^ v/eak third nations involved in their power
rivalry. '^'•
Somehov/ the United States had to rebut these feelings,
Under-Secretary of State Ball, in an address to the NATO
Parliamentarians' Conference on November 16, 1962, reopened
the question of a NATO nuclear force. Although he stated
there was no urgent need from a Kiilitary standpoint, he said
the United States v/as ready ".
. . to give serious
consideration to the crea.tion of a genuinely multilateral,
medium-range ballistic missile force, fully coordinated with
the other deterrent forces of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. "22
Then at the December, 1962, NATO Council Meeting,
2lRonald Steel, "The Demise of NATO," Commentary,
XXXV (May, 1963), 401.
22George 7. Ball, "NATO and the Cuban Crisis," The
Department of State Bulletin
,




Secretary of Defense McNamara appeared to back away from
any additional nuclear f orce;^ . He reiterated that he sav/
no iiaed for additional stratcv^ic forces and recoiiimonded a
change in straLe^-y. He referred to reversing the sv/ord and
shield concept, by giving the role of sv/ord to the conven-
tional forcoL) and making nuclear stren^-th the shield. This
reversal of the sv.ord-shield concept naturally v,as critically
recei/ed in Y.'est Gerr.rany'. '^'^ It v/ai. looked upon by the
Gerraans as openiii^" up the possibility of conventional v/ar on
their territory. It also made their desire for sov.ia control
ox nuclear planning all the more pressing.
At the Nassau Conference, the project of a multi-
lateral force was finally launched. In the comiaunique of
Deceriber Tl, 1962, Article 7 stated:
The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the
purpose of their two Governments v/ith respect to the
provision of the Polaris missile uus t be the development
of a multilateral 2IAT0 nuclear force in the consultation
with other NATO Allies^ They will use their best
endeavors to this end.""*
Article 6 had called for forces already in existence
to be allotted to a nuclear force. It was proposed that the
allocations be made from United States strategic forces, the
British Bomber Command, and from tactical nuclear forces
held in Europe. Thus, the meeting called to discuss a
replacement for the cancelled Skybolt missile appeared to
^
^The New York Times
,
December 13, li)62
^^Ibid., December 22, 1962.
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direct attention to tv.o separate principles: On the one
hand, multilateral (Art. 7) and on the other, multinational
(Art. 6). As events turned out the British obviously
envisioned a future structure of NATO ox'ganized around a
closer commitment of existing- and future national forces,
while the United States planned on a nev/ multilateral force
consisting of submarines or surface ships jointly financed,
ov/ned, and controlled by the participants depending upon
thair contribution.
France loohed upon the Nassau meeting as a special
agreement to perpetuate the British independent force.
Criticism v/as voiced that the Nassau formula had only
bilateral sponsorship and therefore did not include all
nuclear powers v/ithin NATO, despite the fact that France was
later offered Polar is. ^^ Thus, soma claim de Gaulle made
his decision to exclude Britain from the Comiiion Market. If
Britain could have such a strong link and special relation-
ship to the United States, then she didn't belong as a truly
European power. There is no doubt de Gaulle felt excluded
from the Nassau agreement, but on the other hand, he might
well have v/anted to have been excluded, as events since then
have indicated. Following Nassau, a promotion campaign for
MLF commenced and the proposal became a prime objective of
American policy.
^^Ibid., December Jl, lt)62.
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In an effort to meet European desires to gain an
active role in the management of the Alliance's nuclear
power, President Kennedy appointed a Multilateral Force
Negotiating Team in January, 1963, led by Ambassador
26
Livingston Merchant. The purpose of the team was to work
out the concept of a multilateral force in greater detail
and discuss the program with NATO government and military
leaders. After favorable reception of the plan oy the
governments of Germany, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, with some
interest shown by Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands, a
working group v;as established to discuss the basic eleiiients
in detail. In April, 1963, Under Secretary Ball outlined
the major criteria v/hich whould guide the formation of the
force: (1) A large number of participants; (2) a force not
based in one country; (3) withdrawal of components impossible,
and; (4) the decision making process v,-as to be collective.
He further commended the MLF:
Not only is it the best meaiis of dealing with the
nuclear problem in the present political framework; it
is also a means of promoting gradual and constructive
evolution within that framework. The multilaceral force
would offer the great advantage of a further opportunity
to work tov/ard greater unity in Europe and closer^
partnership between Europe and the United States.
26
Alvin J. Cottrell, James E. Dougherty, The Politics
^^ "^^
.
^ A t Ian tic Alliance (New York: Frederick A~ Praeger
,
T96Tr7 p. iOo.
27George \'i . Ball, "The Nuclear Deterrent and the
Atlantic Alliance," .Department of State Bulletin, XLVIII
(May 13, 1963), 739.*
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Beginning in October, 19G3, the working group held
meetings in Paris in an attempt to reach agreement on what
MLF would involve, reach conclusions as to its political
and technical feasibility, and develop language for a draft
charter. The following year the proposal was fairly well,
established.
The Proposal""^
The United States. L'LF proposal consisted of twenty-
five svirface ships resembling merchant-type vessels. Each
ship would carry eight Polaris A-3 missiles with an inter-
mediate range, (2500 plus miles). The crev/s to man these
ships would be made up of t^ie particit3ating NATO nations,
(at least three), v/ith no nationality comprising more than
forty percent of any one ship's complement.
The force would be owned and controlled by an inter-
national organization under the direction of a board
composed of representatives of the joining nations. The
board would have a civilian director-general who would manage
the fleet through a military force commander. The fleet
would be assigned to NATO under the operational control of
SACSUil.
The force was conceived as being open to all members
2^
United States Department of State, "The Multilateral
Force, roiestions and AnsNvers" (V/ashington: November 10, 1964)
pp. 1-22, (mimeographed). All information in this section
relates to this document.
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of NATO willing to assumo a fair saare of the cost, with
such a share aot to exceed forty pei' cent, thereby preventing
any one country from gaining controlling inlex'est. Financial
conLribution would deceriiine command of the ships. Cost of
the total force, including its armaments, bases, and
operations for the first five years v/as estimated at 2.3
billion dollars. Average annual cost would have meant a
contribvitioa of between 3/'l and four per cent of the members'
annual military budgets.
Decision to release any v/eapon would be made by the
board with agreement being reached by a certain percentage
of the repi^esenta L ives and only with concurrence by tiie
United States. Cnce the decision was reached, the missiles
were to be released to Sx-.CEUll to be fired in accordance with
an ijiiegrated nuclear plan of the Alliance.
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of the mixed-
manned crew^ concept, the U6S Biddle (later renamed U3S Claude
V. Rickets), a guided missile destroyer, was placed at the
disposal of interested NATO countries in June, 1964. The
ship conducted operations and- training with personnel from
the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Turkey later withdrew
membership in February, 1965. '^^^
^^"The Mixed-Manning Demonstration," United States
Naval Institute Proceedings , XCI (July, 1965), c? J ; fne
hasnin-,toa Post, Novcmocr 13, 1965.
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Upon the completion of the liiixed-manning demonstrations on
December 1, 1965, Secretary, of the Navy Paul Nitze called
the experiiuen i: a success and an ". . . impressive chapter in
the history of NATO cooperation."
Althou;^h th.e USS Pricket ts proved the feasibility of a
mixed-manning system, the major block of an LILF has been
political and not technical. As demonstrated in Ricketts,
the technicp.l problems of mixin^j; nationalities can be solved,
but the major and age old problem of politics is not so
easily resolved. The debate over a NATO nuclear force has
been in progress for five years. The next three chapters
will be devoted to the political picture in an attempt to





(December 2, 1965), p. A12.
For detaiTs~on problems TnaT were solved on pay, discipline
and rating structure see Desmond "i.ettern, "A aeporter Rides






- THE FilENCH POSITION
Force cle Frappe and Indepsudence
France v/as among the pioneers of atomic research
before 1939, but her first nuclear device exploded in
February, 19C0, grev/ out of an atomic energy program that
was initiated in 1945 arid later reoriented tov/ard military
considerations in 19 52. The resulting French national
nuclear force known as the force d?. frappe or force de
dissuasion has been the subject of tremendous controversy
and debate. The French strategic nuclear force, neverthe-
less, is a force in being and still expanding. It has been
belittled, snerred at, degraded, on the other hand, justified
and used to political advantage. It is no doubt looked
upon with envy by countries not within the "nuclear club."
To be certain, the force is used as a political lever both
domestically and in foreign relations.
Within the country, the notion has been fostered that
a nation as important as Fran-ce should not have to rely on
the nuclear umbrella of an ally. One justification is on
the basis that a French force is necessary to protect France
and Europe from Soviet threats or attack, since the United
••V/olf Mendl, "The Background of French Nuclear Policy,"
International Affairs, XLI (January, 19G5) , 22-30.
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States is now vulnerable and mi^hi nou cari'y out its guaran-
tee to protect Europe. The President of France, Charles
de Gaulle who feels it would be nationally degrading not to
possess nuclear weapons in a nuclear age has brought the
point of trust forth on many occassions:
. . . First, Soviet Russia also now has an enormous
nuclear arsenal which is increasing every day, as more-
over, is that of the United States. Henceforth, America
and Soviet Russia v/ill be capable of striking each other
directly and, doubtless, of reciprocally destroyiiig each
other. It is not certain that they v/ill talie this risk.
No one can tell toda.y v/hen, how, or why one or the other
of these great atomic powers would employ its nuclear
arsenal. It is enough to say this is in order to under-
stand that, as regards the defense of France, the battle
of Europe and even a world war as they were iraagiaed
when NATO ^Yas born everything is now in question. On
the other hand, a French atomic deterrent force is
coming iiito existence and is going to grov/ continuously.
I t is a relatively modest force, it is true, but one
which is changing and will completely change the
conditions of our own defense, those of our interven-
tion in faraway lands and those of the contribution
that we would be able to make to the safeguard of our
allies .^
In de Gaulle's judgment, military matters belong to
his "reserved domain" and this view is widely accepted by
virtue of his hold on the voters and his power over his
Gaullist deputies. Beyond his singular pov/er, the reasoning
is easily sold that a country of France's dimensions and
degree of development should, as a matter of course, have
Charles de Gaulle, "Sixth Press Conference on May 15,
1962" Ma j or Addresses, Sta tenents
,
and Press Conferences of
Ge ne ral Charles ae Gau lie ', May U
,
TJ5 G-January ITIT, TJol
.
(i\ev/ YorlT: Frencli ^r.iijassy
,





some control ovei' nuclear weapons laore assured than an ally's
guarantee that he will use his v/eapons on France's behalf.
Full national ownership and operation of such weapons
satisfies this demand. De Gaulle's insistence on independence
and demand on his own nuclear striking force, for France's
own defense was well stated right after the Nassau agreement:
. . . But also for a great people to have the free
disposition of itself and the means to struggle to
preserve it is an absolute imperati/e, for alliances
have no absolute virtues, whatever may be the sentiments
on which thoy are based. And if one spontaneously loses,
even for a while, the free disposition of oneself, there
is a strong risk of never regaining it. And then, the
conditions in v/hich we presently find ourselves also
make it imperative for us to act in this manner.
Vi'e are in the atomic age and we are a country that
can be destroyed at any i:ioment unless the aggressor is
deterred from the undertaking by the certainty that he
too will suffer frightful destruction. This justifies
both alliance and independence. The Americans, our
allies and our friends, have for a long time, alone,
possessed a nuclear arsenal. So long as they alone had
such an arsenal axid so long as they showed their will to
use it iirjnediately if Europe were a t tacked--ior at that
time Europe alone could be a.t tacked— the Americans acted
in such a way that for France the question of an invasion
hardly arose, since an attack was beyond all probability
. . . . It can be said that, during that period, the
deterrent worked and that there existed a practically
insuperable obstacle to an invasion of Europe. It is
impossible to overestimate the extent of the service,
most fortunately p^iSsive,. that the Americans at that
time, in that way, rendered to the freedom of the world.
Since then the Soviets have also acquired a nuclear
arsenal, and that arsenal is powerful enough to endanger
the very life of America. Naturally, I am not making an
evaluation— if indeed it is possible to find a relation
between the degree of one death and the degree of
another--but the new and gigantic fact is there. From
then on, the Americans found and are finding themselves
confronted with the possibility of direct destruction.
Thus, the immediate defense, and one can say pri\ileged
defense of Europe, and the military participation of the
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Europeans, which were once basic factors of their
strategy, moved by the foi'ce of circumstances into
second place. \:c have just witnessed this during the
Cuban affair.
And then, above and beyond everything; the deterrent
is now a fact for the Russians as for the Araericans,
which means that in the case of a general atomic war,
there would inevitably be frightful and perhaps fatal
destruction in both countries. In these conditions, no
one in the world
—
particularly no one in America—can
say if, where, when, how and to what extent the American
nuclear weapon would be employed to defend Europe . . .
But it remains that the American nuclear power does not
necessarily and immediately meet all the eventualities
concerning Europe and France.
Thus principles and realities combine to lead France
to equip herself with an atomic force of her own.^
Nothing could be more clearly stated than that which
the two foregoing speeches illustrates— da Gaulle wants
"independence" and "greatness" for France and his national
nuclear force is a means to that end. He has continued this
4
same theme throughout all of his speeches on the subject.
Although the theme for public consumption might be "independ-
ence" and "greatness," a number of other points should be
taken into consideration:
(1) T/hen and if a united Europe develops, the force de
frappe well could play an important role in determining the
leadership of such a country.
(2) An independent force may well be the deciding
3
Ibid., "Seventh Press Conference on January 14, 1963,"
pp. 216-T77~
^Ibid., "Address April 19, 1963," pp. 225-26.

26
factor in forcing the United States into a nuclear war
against its will.
(3) On the other hand, the French force might well
be used to keep France out of a conflict into which other-
wise she might be drawn against her v.ill. Undoubtedly, the
Cuban missile crisis made the French public aware of American
power to draw France into a war even while she might prefer
to remain neutral.
Thus v-zith Just these fe\v points the force de dissuasion
is somathiiig to be reckoned with and to be concerned about.
Though very small in comparison to United States or Soviet
power, the fox'ce, noiie the less, has tremendous implicatiops
.
The French claim that "X" number of xMirage 1/ bombers
traveling at twice the speed ox sound carrying CO kilotoa
atomic bombs (the power of the Hiroshima bomb was 20
kilotons) a claiined distance of 1550 miles without refueling
ha/e significance. 'Vith KC 135 tanker planes, which the
United States has sold to France, this distance is reported
5to be almost doubled to just under 3000 miles.
The French Strategic A'ir Force (SAF) with its comple-
ment of 62 Mirage IV bombers will be dispersed at twelve SAF
bases. The hope is that more than 50 per cent vsill always
be operational and on an 24 hour alert, with the ability to
"^France and its Armed Forces. (New York: French
Embassy, press ana Information Jiv'ision, December, 1jG'2),
p.O. The Mirage IV became operational in 1904; a total of
62 planes are to be completed by the end of 1066.
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be air-borne in four minutes. However, one of the glariiig
weaknesses of this force is the short range of the planes
at lov,' altitude . The Mirage IV needs refueling in the air
for attacks further than ''./est Gei'many. The plr.ne uses one-
third of its fu'jl load cliiabin;^- to altitude v/here it becomes
very vulnerable during refueliiig and is easily viev/ed by
G
enemy defensive radar. Providing the force is not knocked
out by an enemy surprise laissile attack at the twelve bases
prior to launch, hov/ luany of the 31 (plus) planes will get
through to their targets? The ansv/er to this question,
after all, deteriaines the significant of the force and
whether or not it is a credible deterrent.
To follow in the second generation, called the Second
Prograiii Lav/ in the time span of 1965-70 are strategic surface
missiles with a range of 2000 miles. By the end of the
period, prance plans to have its first nuclear pov/ered sub-
marine armed v/ith strategic sea-to-surface ballistic missiles
with thermonuclear warheads. Included in the program are
tactical nuclear weapons, with all services armed by 1973.
To finance the second generation weapons for the strategic
nuclear force, $5.72 billion has been allotted in program
6
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,
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The French military budi^et since 1060 avera<^es about
5 per cent of GNP (7 per cent for 1963 when military pensions
are included): this accounts for an increase in total mili-
tary appropriations from 3 . ^^ billion in 19G0 to 4.2 billion
for 1965 v/hen the annual grov/th rate of approxiina tely 4 per
cent in GNP is taken iiito consideration. Tiie cost of the
strategic nuclear force -has stayed v/ithin about 25 per cent
of the totn.1 military bud;^et uinialy by reducing operating
expenditures-- cais reflects the end of Aljerian operations
azid the reduction of nuiaerical strength of iiiox'c th?.n 1
gmillion men in 19(31 to a sci'di^jth of 5J5,000 in 1965. From
the above alone the strategy of France begins to take on a
clear cut definition— reliance on nuclear v,eapons
.
Strategy
From 1954 onwards, a small but influential group of
military technicians favoured nuclear v/eapons. They
theorized that nuclear weapons had a relative cheapness
v/hen compared with the equiva.lent amount of conventional
explosives, because they were infinitely more effective
than conventional weapons and because they would balance
7France and its Armed Forces. op. cit., pp. 52-53.
"Between the scraue'gTc force's first geTierat ion of Mirage IV
aircraft— to be phased out starting in 1966— and second
generation of nuclear missile- launching submarines to be
fully operational around 1970-1973— there will be a transitional
period during which strategic surface-to-surface ballistic
missiles will be set up in scattered hardened sites, and be




the eneniey's numarical superiority on the battlefield
.
Amon^-j this group and since December, 19 52, General
Ailleret nov/ Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, had been
instrumental in studies which led to the manufacture of the
first French nuclear device. General Ailleret is
recognized as one of the leading spokesman of French strategy
today— a strategy that almost completely rules out conven-
tional defense.
Iraraediate "massive retaliation" is seen as the only
alternative to Soviet aggression. Even tactical nuclear
warfare is discarded on the grounds that it ". . . would
completely crush Europe for l,oOO miles from the Atlantic
to the Soviet border."
Thus in General Ailleret 's words:
Nuclear weapons alone seem able to permit a defensive
without surrendering territory, something which neither
conventional forces, nor even forces engaging in the
limited use of tactical nuclear weapons against the ,^
aggressive force alone, could presume to accomplish.
Characterizing conventional defense and nuclear
defensive battle as not being satisfactory for Europe,
General Ailleret sees the only alternative as being im;aediate
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strategic action v/hich in the event of aggression consist
of:
(1) Destroying, by strategic nuclear attack, the
roots of the aggression and its chances of building up.
(2) Terminating the action by a battle aimed simply
at absorbing the momentum of the aggression—which may
have already broken through—and at destroying it or
forcing it back behind its bases of departure . ^'^
France feels this strategy alone establishes a
credible deterrent against possible Soviet aggression;
aggression that is defined not as major or limited aggression
but as "characterized aggression" or "apparent aggression."
Apparent aggression covers all sorts of possible border
incidents and must be considered as minor and not a trigger-
ing device for the automatic strategy. Characterized
aggression on the other hand is real and is defined:
. . . as a penetration, vising force against the
defense elements encountered, reaching a depth into the
territory defined in relation to the nature of the
region involved, and putting enough forces in the field
for it not to be considered as anything other than an
action concordant with the \yill of the country to v/hich
these forces belong to conquer part of ','estern Europe.
That is why we suggest a defensive position designed
not to check powerful attacks, but to gauge the minimum
level of enemy attack that would constitute aggression
which, in turn, could set the defensive nuclear strategy
1 . 14 °"'in motion. ^^
Thus automatic nuclear retaliation is brought into







allows for minimal conventional forces on the frontiers •with
greater reserve forces positioned v/ithin the couatry--backed
up with a strategic nuclear force controlled nat iona lly--a
posture to which France is deeply committed. Naturally a
strategy such as this is not compatible with the United
States doctrine of "flexible response." Neither is it
compatible v/ith an idea such as the MLF, or for that matter
v/ith any integration v/ithin NATO. But it must be remembered
that "... because each nation sees its destiny in different
terms, each also concei/es of different means or stz'ategy to
15
achieve its objectives." General de Gaulle wants the
destiny of France v/ithin his control and is av/are of the
bargaining power an independent force gives him.
De C-aulle's Leadership and Viev/s
In simple terms it is fair to estimate de Gaulle's
primary goal v/as to achieve "greatness and independence" for
France. After assuming power in 19 53, one of his first
foreign policy moves v/as to propose an international
directorate or triumvirate consisting of France, the United
States and the United Kingdom which would control defense as
well as diplomatic policies of the NATO allies. V.'hen this
proposal was rejected by both the United States and Great
Britain, it must have been received as a block in the path
15
Carl H. Amme , Jr., "Nuclear Cont-'ol and the Multi-
lateral Force," United States Naval Institute Proceedings,
XCI (April, 1965), lb.
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to attaining a great pov/er role for France. Many have
contended that this rejection coupled with the Roosevelt
and Churchill rebuffs during IVorld V/ar II caused basic
hostility and set the pattern for de Gaulle to seek independent
policies for France. Be that as it may, the facts stand out
that de Gaulle v/ill accept nothing but independence for
France along with a great power role in sharing in big
decisions.
A favorite observation of de Gaulles' points out that
conditions under which Europe after the war "found it
expedient to turn over to the United States the responsibility
for its protection have changed profoundly.' His feeling
that France and Europe should not accept domination by the
United States through any form of integration was clearly
outlined at his press conference on April 11, 1961:
It is intolerable for a great State to leave its
destiny up to the decisions and action of another State,
however friendly it may be. In addition, it happens
that, in integration . . . the integrated country loses
interest in its national defense, since it is not
responsible for it. The whole structure of^the alliance
then loses its resilince and its s trength . ''^
16United States Congress, Sen'^ te Coinmittee on Foreign
Relations, probleras and Trends in Atlantic Partnership I,
87 th Congress , 2d Session"^ DocuHeni; No. To 2 0'^-si'^i"JtonT
Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 35-36.
-^"^De Gaulle, op. cit. p. 124.
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The project of a lault ila tcral force v;as considered in
Paris as a scheme to isolate France in V.estern Europe and
strengthen United States hegemony. Da Gaulle wants to avoid
links that make him dependent on another— the normal situation
in his view is for Europe (under French leadership) to
develop and issue its own policy. In rienry Kissinger's
words: "This is vvhy dc Gaulle has opposed the Nassau
Agreement, which tied the British nuclear program to that of
1;
the United States, and the proposed NATO multilateral force."
In effect, any nuclear program that gives the United States
the final say or veto in the control of weapons is and
would bo unacceptable to the President of France. This he
outlined in his famous Press Conference on January 14, 1963,
when he rejected Britain's meiiibership in the Co:imon Market
and said of the Nassau proposal:
. . . To turn over our weapons to a multilateral force,
under a foreign command, would be co act contrary co that
principle of our defense and our policy. It is true chat
we too can theoretically retain the ability to take back
in our hands, in the supreme hypothesis, our atomic
v/eapons incorporated in the multilateral force. But how
could we do it in practice during the unheard moments of
the atomic apocalypse? And then, this multilateral force
necessarily entails a web of liaisons, xransinissions and
interferences within itself, and on the outside a ring of
obligatioiis such that, if an integral part were suddenly
snatched from it, there would be strong risk of paralyzing
it just at the moment, perhaps, when it should act.-*-^
York:
1 ti
Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New






De Gaulle, op. cit., p. 219.

34
Of course the whole timing of the Nassau agreement
has brought up the quesjtion of whether this in itself was a
cause for France to reject British membership in the EEC.
Undoubtedly the fact that a raultilateral program was negotia-
ted in a bilateral context which only tended to strengthen
the view of a special Anglo-American relationiJhip makes it
at least a contributing cause. As if to point out that
France was left out of -the negotiations de Gaulle said:
Of course, I am only speaking of this proposal and
agreeiiient because they have been published and because
their content is known .... France has taken note of
the Anglo-American Nassau agreement. As it was
conceiv'ed, undoubtedly no one will be suprised that we
cannot subscribe to it. 20
In a staff study, the Committee on Foreign Relations
called the bilateral negotiations the most serious and
21least defensible aspect of the Nassau meeting. From
another aspect de Gaulle probably felt badly discriminated
against— this ^7as the reversal of the "sword and shield"
strategic concept. Prior to December, 1962, NATO's non-
nuclear forces were always referred to as the "shield,"
while the nuclear force was called the "sword." The final
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the Pi'ime Minister agi'ced that in addition to havin^^; a
nuclear shield it is important to have a non-nuclear
sv/ord."'" This reversal of terras naturally did nothing to
contribute to basic United States credibility in Europe's
eyes (comniitnient to use nuclear forces to defend Europe if
attacked), and only tended to strengthen de Gaulle's
pronouiiceraents on dependence on no one--a consistent theme.
Explicit ill amiouncin^ a lack of confidence in the
American will to defend Europe de Gaiille has said:
For Pra,nce to deprive herself of the means capable
of dissuading the adversary fx"om possible attack . . .
would mean that she v.'ould confide her defense aiid there-
fore her existence, and in the end her policy to a
foi'eign and for that m.atter, an uncertain protector .'^'^
This again points to de Gaulle's prime objective of
independence, grandeur and rank for France. Nonetheless,
initially, France claimed she did not object to her other
NATO allies joining a project such as the IILF . Evidently
she counted on it never materializing. In February, of 1964,
the Ambassador of France to the United States, Herve Alphand,
explained French non-participation in MLF negotiations in a
speech:
. . . This v/ill explain to you why we are not taking-
part in the negotiations for the establishment of a
multilateral Atlantic force, because we do not have the
financial and technical means botii to continue with oux'
09
^ Ibid. Secretary McNamara had just referred to this
reversal "ax the December NATO Council Meeting— '^es t Germany
v/as also highly critical of the new sword-shield concept.
^As cited in Amme
,






own effort and to take part in the effort undertaken
within NATO. I should add that, even though we do not
understand too well the conditions under which such a
multilateral force could be used, we have done nothing
to discourage anyone from participating in the studies
under way at present. 24
In the summer of 1964, when the United States cajiipaign
for an MLF was in full swing. Chancellor Erhard met President
Johnson in Texas and agreed to attempt to set up MLF by
December. At this point de Gaulle started an anti-J,!LF
campaign and accused Ger^iany of submitting to United States
domination. French hostility is not hard to understand in
the context that an MLF concept v.'ould be a block to de Gaulle's
vision of Europe dependent in the future on French nuclear
power. 1,'est German participation in an ML? leads in the
opposite direction from the independent force and policy which
de Gaulle envisions; a policy completely independent of the
26
United States under French leadership and ultimate control.
French Premier Georges Pompidou spoke of MLF
hostility, in November, 1964, declaring; ". . . we can ask
ourselves if such a multilateral force is not destructive
for Europe, provocative for certain other countries, and
27finally directed more or less against France." In stressing
"Herve Alphand, "Does France Have a Dilema?" (Detroit
Economic Club of Detroit, February 24, 1964), pp. 9-10
^
^The Trashing ton Post
,
July 23, 1984.
26The New York Times
,
August 9, 1964.
27The T/ashington Post, November 7, 1954.
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opposition against ^s'est German part icipiition, he said:
If the multilateral force should end in the creation
of a sort of German-American military alliance, we would
not be able to consider such a result perfectly
compatible v/ith the relations which we maintain with the
Federal Hepublic as they result from the Franco German
Treaty. It would, not be compatible either v/ith our
conception of the defense of Europe, nor with the idea
that we, and also our opponents in Parliament have of
th.e policy of European defense. 2*^
The same month, de Gaulle in a speech at Strasbourg
summoned Suropo to follov; his lead a.nd bring- his visioii to
realization. He asked for "... The acconpliGhment in
common with Germany of a great ambition, :i t once very aacieiit
and very modern: The construction of a European-Europe. That
is to say a Europe independent, pov/erful, and influential in
the midst of a free world. "''"^
De Gaulle in essence e::pects the rest of Y.'estern
Europe and in particular irest Germany to be dependent on
France in precisely the way he refuses to be dependent on
the United States. To strengthen the argument, France voices
the concern that a concept such as the I,ILF would start the
Germans tov/ard being a nuclear pov/er, yet de Gaulle does not
consider the fact that Germany wants the same equality France
wants, but without an independent force. He has made it
clear that in his viev/ Europe should be organized and led by
a Franco-German cooperation, but it seems in such a combination
"^Ibid
^^Ibid., November 23, 1964.
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France would be the more equal of tlie two.
Paul- Henri Spaak has described the French President
as having a sinister raoti/e of seeking to hasten the
departure of United- States forces from Europe— a ir^ov^e
de Gaulle claims is inevitable.
The void thus created might lead the other European
countries to take refuge under the sheltering v/ings of
France, v/hich then alone could afford them soir.e protec-
tion. This v/ould be tantaiaount to a French hegemony in
Europe, the achieverient of the Gaullist grand design. '^^
This design seeks an association of European nations
where in the bonds between partners are no closer than
those which held the Triple Alliance together prior to
1914. "31
Though opinions are divided on what de Gaulle's
ultimate objective is, his actioiis to date regarding NATO
and nuclear control within NATO seem clear.
France as a great nation must have its own nuclear
deterrent--grea t countries have nuclear weapons. This
deterrent must be independently controlled--France must have
the ultimate decision along v/ith the decision making authority,
for to not have control, would mean American or NATO dominance.
Integration of any sort means giving up sovereignty v;hich
de Gaulle regards as vital to France's national interests
and honor. Though commitment to the North Atlantic Alliance
with a nuclear umbrella provided by the United States has







been a continuous thread in de Gaulle's policy, his non-
support of NATO may eventually bo his undoing. Cuite
possibly he has overreacted as he did in the summer of 1965
against the Common Market— only time and the French vote
will tell. As noted, de Gaulle v/ants American protection
v/ithout integration or United States dominance— in the
words of Drew Middleton; ". . .he v.'ants to have his cake and
32
eat it too.
The United States, on the other hand, has a strong
policy of offering protection, but v/ith integration and
without separate national nuclear forces. The MLF proposal
as a NATO Nuclear Force was an attempt to bring this policy
into reality and close the schism that was developing in
NATO.
on
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From Carapaig,a to PostponGuient
The spx'iii-i of 1D63 marked the beginning of the active
promotional campaign for the MLF. At this point, United
States diplomatic pressure was applied to bring as many NATO
countries as possible to join discussions that v/ere to
commence in Octobar. In general, the military aspects of
the proposal v/ere discussed in T.ashiugton , v/hile the legal
and political problems were handled by a working group in
Paris. Initially, Germany, Great Britain, Belgium, Greece
and Turkey, v.-ith the Netherlands joining last, participated
in the conferences. France refused any form of participa-
tion. These same countries less Belgium and Liter Turkey
participated the following summer in mixed-manning of the
USS Ricketts,
A year after the campaign had started, it v/as obvious
that the United States was deeply committed to establishing
a NATO multilateral force. In May, 1964, Under Secretary of
State George Ball announced to a conference held at the Center
for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, that the MLF
should meet four conditions:
First, it should be assigned to NATO by all countries
par cicipat ing in the force. To meet this, we propose
that it be collectively owned by the participants and
that all participating nations share in the costs of
creating, maintaining, and operating it.
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Second, it should not be predominately based on the
soil oi' any one nation. To meet this condition, we are
proposing a sea-based force consisting of Polar is- type
missiles mounted on surface wai'ships. This force,
deployed on the high seas, would operate outside the
national limits of any state.
Third, it should be managed and operated by nationals
of all participating countries under such conditions
that it could not be withdrawn from the alliance to
serve the national uses of any participating government.
To meet this requirement, we propose that the ships
themselves be m.anned by mixed crev/s of nationals of the
participating nations.
The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretary of Defense have concluded that an efficient
first-class force can be created in this fashion.
SACEUi^ has stated he would v/elcome the force as a
significant addition to NATO's deterrent forces.
fourth, the decision to fire the Polaris weapons
sho~ld"'"]5e a collective decision of the participating
nations. One proposal is that political control be
exercised through an executive body representing the
participating nations. Obviously this control question
is the heart of the matter. vre are confident it can be
solved.
In concluding, he stated that "... unless you
gentlemen are able, out of the collected v/isdom represented
here, to come up with a better solution than the multilateral
force, I strongly urge your support for that proposal."
By the fall of 1964, the proposal for the MLF had
reached the point that a timetable was established for
treaty signature by the end of 1964. But by this time,
Britain had open misgivings on the subject which had the
George ]\\ Ball, "U.S. Policy Toward NATO." NATO in
Ouest of Cohesion, Karl H. Cerny and Henry Ti' . Brief s"j ecFitor
(New York" Treoerick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 15-19.
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effect of makiiii^ the MLF appear as strictly a German-
American venture. This helped to cause Franco-German
relations as well as Franco-American relations to drop to a
new low, and only added emphasis to the con trovert-y.
Britain either decided to attempt a diversionary move
or make a bid for soi.ae leadership in NATO by submit tiny a
plan for mix manning of the existing strike aircraft and
missiles in Europe. ''^ The plan, eventually named the Atlantic
Nuclear Force (ANF) allowed the United States to reduce the
pressure that had built up over the IILF. . The President
declared in a news conference ou I'lovember 2'6, ". . . ''.Te want
to work out with all nations, the free nations, the base
solution possible. yre are not going to be adamant in our
attitudes."*^ The follov/ing month, in a major speech at
Georgetown University, the President tried to eliminate
fears that relations among the countries m.aking up the
Atlantic Alliance had reached a crisis. Mr. Johnson declared,
".
. . Me come to reason, not to dominate. V,'e do not seek to
have our way, but to find a common way." He went on to stress
proceeding "with due delibera-tion, with due respect for the
interests of others and with an open door for those who aiay
2Alastair Buchan, The Multilateral Force: An
Historical Perspecti/e, The l7rs"titute for TtrategiTT'Studies
,










After Prime Minister V/ilson met with President
Johnson in December, the United States position seemed
clearer. It was a position that would pro/ide flexibilicy
for achieving the basic ^^oals that the MLl^ was designed to
attain. Both governments had agreed to the need for unity
within the Atlantic Alliance. They agreed to cooperation in
finding an equitable arrangement to satisfy the interests of
othez' members, but within the li'amework of axi American veto.
The joint corununique that was issued also called for
preventing the proliferation of nuclear wezipons .'^
Apparently, the United States accepted the British
proposal of an ANF as a complement not as a replaceiaent to
MLv . This meant American policy could move ouc from under
the criticism that the multilateral force was strictly a
German-Anarican venture designed to isolate France and give
Germany nuclear weapons. By letting Great Britain proceed
to bargain for their Atlantic Nuclear Force, the impression
was given that American pressure was off and the burden for
finding a new formula was shi-fted to the European side. The
greater the show of increased British participation, the
more the appearance of United States domination could be
A
'Ibid., December 4, 1964. Text of Georgetown Univ-
ersity Speech
5 Ibid., December 9, 1364. Text of joint communique.
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avoided. Thus also evading the stii^ma of a special Gernan-
American nuclear relationship which would help satisfy
critics in NATO, as well as the Soviet Union, the United
States could ^'ive the appearance of sitting back and listening
while still tactfully leading frora behind.
Many thought the final demise of the program had come
in January, 1965, when the State Department closed down its
MLF office and its Director, Gerard Smith, retired from
Governiiiant service. Nonetheless, the Pentagon still main-
tains a section on MLF. And since that time, a great many
prouncements have been made that v.'ould indicate some interest
for an MLF project or some variation of it still was being
maintained in V.'ashington up until the summer of 1966.
Secretary of State Rusk, in outlining the United
States position on March 6, 1965, quoted the President as
making the American position clear;
. . . v/e think it is highly im.portant to develop
arrangements v/ithin the Alliance that v/ill provide an
opportunity for the non-nuclear members to participate
in their ov/n defense, while avoiding the spread of
national nuclear systems. I strongly hope in these
talks there will be progress that will allow us to move
on to fruitful multilateral discussions.^
\i . W. Rostow, then chairman of the State Department
Policy Planning Council, reiterated this same theme in an
address before The German Society for Foreign Affairs
Dean Rusk, "Our Atlantic Policy." Department of
State Press Release No. 39, March 6, 1965. "These talks"




in Bonn on March 19, 1965, by stating:
. . . we have an opportunity to strengthen on a world
basis the commitment to collective, rather than narrowly
national, systems of defense. President Johnson has
made it crystal clear that, so far as the United States
is concerned, we are ready to c;o forv/ard to make a truly
integrated Atlantic force, in which nuclea.r and non-
nuclear nations would participate on a basis of equality,
leaving the door open for coordination within NATO for
those members which may not wish to join such a force
at this time, leaving the door open also to adjustments
we might wish to make as Europe moves towards effective
political unity. T7e remain convinced that it is in this
direction the right answer lies in the critical matter of
nuclear collaboration. If there is one area above others
where we must m.aintain a deep understanding and a common
front, it is in nuclear affairs: deterrence and arms
control negotiations alike.
7
In an unprecedented TV broadcast direct to the people
of Europe via the nev/ Early Bird Communications Satellite,
President Johnson commem.orated the 20th anniversary of V.S.-
Day and made a majoi' stator.ient of American policy toward
Europe. After indirectly criticizing President de Gaulle's
"narro\y nationalism" as destructive of Atlantic unity, the
President alluded to the MLF/A2JF by stating:
Fifth, we must work out more effective forms of
common defense. /ill Atlantic nations who wish to do so
have a right to share in collective nuclear defense while
halting the spread of nuclear weapons."^
The President said that ". . . if one of us cannot
join in a common venture , it will not stand in the v/ay of the
7 \Y.W. Rostow, "United States Policy Towards Europe."
Departm.ent of State Press rie lease No. 51, March 19, 1965.
The New York Times
,
May S, 1965. Text of President
Johnson's speech marking the 20th anniversary of the end of




rest of us . "^ This indicated that the policy still existed
almost a year ago and that those nations favoring it were"
to go ahead despite strong opposition by France and milder
disapproval by other NATO nations.
In July, 1965, as publicity developed over the fact
that the United States might seek a non proliferation treaty
even at the expense of an Atlantic Nuclear Force, V.'est
Gerriian Foreign .Minister, Gerhard Schrooder, dropped some
hints in a nev/spaper interview that his country might have
to acquire its ov.'n nuclear arms if an Atlantic nuclear
deterrent or equivalent v>'ere not found to satisfy Bonn's
10
security needs. Though the irn.plicat ions were denied some
few days later by the German Socialist leader, IVill}/- Brandt,
as having no justification, it is hardly a coincidence that
after a five month lapse, the Soviet Union suddenly agreed
to resume disarmament talks in Geneva. Just prior to the
disariaament talks. United States Presidential Envoy,
Averell Harriman assured V/est German Chancellor Erhard
"..
. . that the United States efforts to reach agreement
with the Soviet Union on non-^jrolif erat ion of nuclear




, July 11, 19 65. This article
ended with the report that Secretary of State Dean .^usk
assured the ""est German Ambassador that the U.S. "will not
sacrifice plans for a 2{AT0 Multilateral Nuclear Force to an
East-vrest non proliferation agreement."
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nuclear force, the Atlantic Nuclear Force, or some similar
arran.??ei:ient . " Making good on the pronouncement, the
United States draft treaty to the 17 nation Geneva
disariiianent conference, at the end of July, left a loop
hole for a nuclear sharing proposal.
V/hether or not this stand was a bargaining position,
only tiiVie will tell. The fact is the United States has
consistently stated its position which has remained firm
throughout discussions on an anti-proliferation agreeuien t--
that is, not to subordinate the idea of an Atlantic nuclear
force to the principle of non-proliferation. On the other
hand, Great Britain appeared to want to explore the possibi-
lity further.
The then British Foreign Secretary, Llichael Stewart,
met with Secretary of State Dean .'^uslc in October of 1965,
and the press reports at that tine indicated that the
British Labor Government wanted to give special scrutiny
to anything that might impede agreement with the Soviet
12Union. This same theme which was to include lengthy





^'Ibid., October 12, 1965; James Reston put it in
stronger words : "The British Foreign Secretary, Michael
Stewart, was even more explicit about putting a nuclear
agreement with the Soviet Union before any nuclear organiza-




his visit to Washington in December. Naturally, laiiguage
of this nature caused reactions in V-'est Germany, and
although progress had been made on Defense Secretary
McNamara's proposal for a nuclear defense coordinating
committee, (knov/n as the McNaiuara Coia:nittee)
,
the V.'est
German Government announced it was anxious to share in a
nuclear weapons system and not just consultations.
As the visit of Chancellor Erhard to Vi'ashington in
December, 19C5, approached, public announcements both in
Germany and the United States left little uncertainty as
to v/hat the Federal Republic would seek. The newly
reelected Chancellor declared that NATO now must "adjust
itself to new political and military conditions," Germany
must have "a share in the nuclear defense in keeping with
the extent of the danger and with the extent of the
13burdens." Bonn was convinced that the MLF or some variant
of the concept would be a means to obtain this share and
burden in nuclear matters. Speculation and conjecture
grew as to how far President Johnson would go in satisfying
West German demands. But, the pronouncement at the end
of the visit simply alluded to the fact that there was
a problem and that a search would continue for an accept-
able formula in discussions between the two countries
and other interested Allies. Both the V,'ashington and
13




New Yoi'k aav/spapers immediately declared the r,ILF/ANF
ended. " If the idea of such a nuclear force is abandoned
\yhy did the United States adopt it as a policy?
'tV'hy IILF as a United States Se curit y Policy ?
MLF was designed as a priiaary means to strengthen
the unity v.'ithin the Atlantic Alliance by resolving the
differences that developed over the control of nuclear
v/eapons. As time progressed, the noii-nuclear nations wanted
more of a say in the control over their destiny. The
desire for equal status v;as bound to develop from national
pride, from fear, from uncertainty, and from disagreement
over doctrine and strategy established by the NATO nuclear
powers. It was felt as pressure of this sort develox^ed, the
obvious alternative would make members of NATO either seek
their own nuclear force, or if unable to do so, attempt
neutralism. The possibility existed, (as it does today),
that they might seek alignment elsewhere.
MLF was to provide the means for all members of the
Alliance to participate closely in the ownership, control,
and manning of a strong nuclear force. MLF was designed to
act as an alternative to unnecessary, expensive, militarily
superfluous, and politically divisive independent nuclear
forces.
Ibid., December 23, 1965; "Nuclear Force Lurial
Clears Air , " The V ashington Star , Becombor ?'3, l'J85; "Idea
of Mixed-Manned Nuclear Fleet Dies '"-uietly After 5 years of
Debate," The New York Times, December 23, 1965.
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By acting as an alternative to national forces, MLF
was considered to be an anti-proliferation device as it
would not involve transferring control of nuclear weapons
into the hands of any one state. Control arrangements that
were envisioned would mean the force could only be filled by
decision of its governing body on which all members would
be represented and over which the United States was to have
a veto. It was possible for MLF to r.dd nothing to the total
nuclear weapons that were programmed, therefore it could
easily have been accommodated to a freeze level of v/eapons
restriction. Necessary production could easily replace
existing obsolete v/eapons. The force was to be subject to
the same safeguards that other NATO nuclear forces presently
are under, so as to prevent any use in an accidental oz-
unauthorized manner.
Actually, a sea-borne force v;ould be more secure
under multilateral arrangements than the present European
land-based missiles. Under the present bilateral arrange-
ment all national crews operate the missile with Americaxi
control of the v/arheads assui-ed only by attending American
personnel and electronic links. The 40 per cent rule would
prevent all national crews from complete control, and the
governing body made up of all participating members v/ould
control the permissive links needed to release the v/eapoas
with United States concurrence.
The fear that che Unixed States might someday take
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Vestern Europe into a nuclear holocaust against its v/ishes
would be allayed. Conversely, the anxiety that the United
States might, in the future, v/ithdrav/ its nuclear weapons
from the defense of Europe v/ould be satisfied. MLF would
prevent the United States from withdrawing- the weapons
co7Gring 3o\-iet MREM targets without the consent of all the
menibers . Access to American nuclear plannin:^, operations,
and targeting, which MLF would provide as an intej;rated
force, would also assure its allies chat, in fact, American
nuclear weapons are coiaznitted to the defense of Europe and
would remain comiiiitted . The participation in allied strategy
would not only s'ive the menibers coiifidence and reassurance,
but it \,'Ould provide experience and a thorough understanding
of the responsibilities that go with being a nuclear pov/er.
By being av/ax^e of hov/ target assessiaehts and assignemnts
are made, it would encourage an awareness by the member of
the need for a realistic balance between conventional and
15
nuclear forces. The present military situation calls for
such a balance which the United States and SACHUil have
stressed.
MLF v.'ould meet the requirement for a modern defensive
nuclear deterrent needed to counter the extensive number of
Soviet :,I.iB:.Is in Russia capable of reaching the NATO area.
15
John Newhouse , "The Multilateral Force: An




The advantages of not having to place a major number of
missiles on the Continent to meet this threat are obvious.
The missile's, to be of any worth, v/ould have to be mobile
—
the mechanics of which v/ould be a liiajor undertaking. The
conspicuousness of a large number of mobile missiles would
create psychological problems as well as sabotage problems.
The sea-borne force would give mobility without being an
awesome presence in the density of the European land mass.
Another goal for MLF was the attractioii it should
have provided for the present independent nuclear forces of
Great Britain and France. As already seen, the British
proposal of an AN? provided an alternative to Great Britain
to give up its expensive national force. It v/as hoped both
powers could marge their forces with the 'ALF and by assign-
ing a large portion of the costs of their weapons to the
prograin, make a tremendous savings. Although Fvzince did
not wish to join, the hope was that if some form of MLF did
materialize with Great Britain's participation, France
would be left isolated and therefore, might eventually
join— this naturally was pure conjecture and would probably
not occur until after the de Gaulle reign. Advocates of
MLF felt that to not suppoj-'t MLF because of France, left
only the alternatives of doing nothing or supporting




serious division in the Alliance over the German pi'oblem
and possibly to the eventuality of a German nuclear force.
The design was to brin-- the members of the Alliance
together through cooperation, coordination, and unity, in
operating a major nuclear force. It \yas to he an advanced
force of a liiajor political military impoi'tance which would
have the psychological advantage of confronting the Soviet
Union with a cohesive, unified nuclear deterrent. There
was even hope that the fox'ce might well have acted as the
persuasive lever to convince the Soviet Union to give up the
arms race. But the problem today is that the Soviet threat
is no longer given much stature by many of the NATO members.
Manj^ critics of ML? have attached the force on the
basis that it was redundant and ixief f ic lent . It must be
granted that the military functions of IILF can be equally
well performed by Polaris submarines and r.Iinutemen, but
this in itself doeo not laake :.ILF redundant or ineffective.
By acting as a substitute alone this argument is answered.
From a purely econOi;iic point of viev/, the sharing of cost by
Allies can be well accepted by the United States.
From an entirely different approach and a point that
will have to be taken into consideration in greater amounts
is the emergence of China as a nuclear power. The United
States nuclear force structure will undoubtedly have to
expand as Communist China's nuclear capability grov/s . MLF
could well ease the burden by assuming a deteri'ent role
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against Russia, thus relcasin.-^ ICEM's and Polaris as well,
for tax'geting against China.
Often the MLF is criticized as bein^^ too vulnerable
a target. Ainitai Etzioni, v/ho is a sharp critic of MLF,
reported hearing that a Pentagon war game perforiaed for
Vi'est Geriaany shov/ed the forces to have a greater chance for
survival than land-based ICBM's. Etzioni said, "it shov/ed
that after a first strike, only one-third of the land-
based Minutemen would survive, v/hile oO percent of the MLF
17
ships would survive." Though this might have teen a
"sales pitch" to convince Vest Gerraan military leaders, it
is only necossary to look at the environment in which MLF
would operate to realize that destruction would be diffi-
cult.
The ships were to operate in three to four million
square miles of ocean. Configuration was to be similar to
many ships in the area. For example, in the Mediterranean
Sea alone, upwards on one thousand ships of all kinds can
be found on any given day. It would be a difficult task
to keep all these ships identified constantly and thereby
know exactly which ship was to be destroyed. The enemy
1 7
"Multilateral Force or Farce?" New York Times
Magazine (December 13, 1964) p. 25. Etzioni and Herman Kahn,
a supporter of MLF, conducted a discussion on MLF moderated
by Hanson Bald'.vin, Military Editor of the New Yoi'k Times.
16
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problem is an ago old one: detection, identification,
conversion, and finally kill.
Once- the problem of detecting and identifying the
missile ship is solved, then this information must be
converted into an effective attack. This takes time and in
the process the ship has moved and probably launched its
missiles. In addition, even m.erchant ships have a certain
19
inherent nuclear hardness to other than direct hits.
The ship's missiles can probably be launched even if the
vessels were dead in the water and in the process of sinking.
Enemy considerations and foz'ces must therefore insure
complete destruction, v/hich raises his force ability and
requirements to accomplish such a feat.
MLF is often compared to United States strategic
forces with the idea that first MLF \vould always be used in
connection with American strikes, and therefore only
contribute less than 10 per cent in striking power. Two
hundred missiles are considered to be a minor force in
comparison to the United States damage limiting forces. But
when comparing MLF with Russian missiles threatening the
United States today, the force is more formidable. 'iVhen
related to the Soviet Union's IREM's and MRBM's targeted on
Europe, which are estimated to be between 500-800 missiles,




weapon because of integration with American strikes. This,
of course, presupposes the United States will live up to
its prcnouhced policies. Nevertheless, MLF's role of
deterrence would be fori:iidable since its capability, has been
estimated at beinj able to destroy botv/een twenty-five and
20100 Soviet cities. V/ould the Soviet Union consider this
cost too high in risking any agg-ression? This, after all,
is the role of detex'rence. Can the So/iet Union count on
an American veto or must it take into consideration the
chance that the United States will back its ^aarancee?
The question of credibility has created a great debate,
but it seep.is that the question of a veto arising is dismissed
from the United States view point. Europe is dependent on
the United States deterrent and will be for iiiany years to
come. It seems inconceivable that Europe could become
involved in a nuclear war without United States participation,
and any situation that involves the United States in a
nuclear war would a.lso involve the use of 1,[LF . The question
of credibility becomes involved only in relation to a first
strike in answer to a conventional Soviet attack. For, if
the Soviet Union uses nuclear weapons first, there is ao
doubt, or a t least the Soviet Union cannot doubt, that the
.Vest would use nuclear weapons in returii, regardless of ?,ILF.
But is credibility actually in question with regard
"Multilateral Force or Farce", op. cit., p. 25,
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to a first strike in response to a Soviet conventional
attack? First, it is not necessary to consider ULF as a
first strike weapon. Undoubtedly, if tiie decision is raade
to conduct a nuclear response to a conventional attack, the
weapons utilized v;ill probably be of the small tactical
field- type. i.ILF was to be held in reserve to deter the
Soviet Union from usin^;; the MilBM force targeted on u'estern
Europe. The decision on the use of the multilateral force,
which would be a part of the v.'est's total nuclear forces,
v/ould not be made independent of the American decision to
use the majority of its tactical and stratej;ic weapons.
Credibility, therefore, is dismissed as an argu^aent agaiiist
J.ILF on the grounds that MLF neither is less credible nor
is it more credible than the existing nuclear forces.
The v/hole idea of IILF v/as to give the Europeans a
greatei" role in planning, coordination, consultation, and
the decision making-process of the American nuclear decisions
It seems in any event that the Europeans would not authorize
the use of llLF without American approval regardless of a
United States veto. By tying into the American forces the
Europeans are guaranteed that, first the United States will
not pull out of Europe, and secondly, the United States
caiuiot take them into a nuclear war without their represen-
tation. This then is the principal advantage over national
nuclear forces which the LILF was designed to replace.
National forces can only cause the United States to
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back av/ay from Europe by the fear that independent action
could precipitate a nuclear war against American will.
l>fational forces will not permit other European nations any
representation aiid therefox^e the losses to unity and common
defense would bo considerable. American presence in Europe
on the forward line guarantees United States response, but
if the growth of independent forces is allowed to continue,
the United States may well pull out of Europe. In other
words, an UL? concept helps to guarantee United States
presence, national nuclear forces v/ill tend to rei:io\^e American
guarantees. It is more likely that the Soviet Union v/ould
be prone to undertake armed aggression if only independent
national forces were the restraining motive; how much
restraint, after all, can a force of 62 vulnerable bombers
muster?
Nonetheless, the European argument must be taken
into consideration. So much is at stake when it comes to
nuclear war that countries feel it is in their vital interest
to be able to control nuclear pov.-er. Different national
interests are not only involved within the NATO area, but
in extra European concerns as well. Each country, due to
geographic location alone, has a different outlook on
strategy. These, then, are problems that are present and
must be investigated in seeking the answers to the question:
Was and is iML? a valid national security policy?

CHAPTER V
OTHER KEY COUNTRY POSITIONS
Federal Republic of Germany
Of all the countries iiivolved with the IILF , Geriiiany
is the stron>j;est supporter and proponent of a mixed-manned
fl6et. Most sourcCvS indicate that all levels of German
society were and are not particularly motivated toward the
developiaont of an independent nuclear force or national owner-
ship of nuclear weapons; nevertheless, German lea.dership was
vitally interested in joining the llLF for a nu-iber of reasor^s
The primary reason can be attributed to the geographic
location of 7,'est Germany and its division. Understandably,
V;"est Germany is extremely sensitive to the number of Soviet
medium-range ballistic missiles aimed at Vr'estern Europe.
Since the installation of the Soviet missiles, SACSUH has
consistently called for an effective counterf orce . Mili-
tarily, the Soviet missiles can be and are covered by
other means, tut the psychological advantage of an allied
force in which Germany could play a major role is obvious.
A second major reason for strong support is the link
it would create with the United States, both defensively and
politically. Germany is wholly dependent on the United
States and the Vi'estern Alliance for defensive support; she
feels any withdrawal of this support would be disastrous.
MLF. would definitely tie the United States and its nuclear
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weapons to the defense of Gei^many. Politically, the MLF
would be a means of influencing the United States and,
since Germany v.'ould be a major contributor, she would have a
certain leverage over American military strategy and foreign
policy
.
Third, the United States campaign for an I,ILF project
was pushed hard in regards to Germany with most of the
opposition acquiescing. The Pentagon conducted waz" games
for German observers in an effort to convince them of the
military value and survivability of a surface force after a
first strike had been received. The strongest opposition
came from the Bavarian Christian Socialist leaders Franz
Strauss and Karl Guttenberg. Guttenberg supjDorted the idea
of an independent European force while Strauss, not coiaplete-
ly rejecting MLF, envisioned a "two pillar" system of defense
linking Europe and the United States in a common strategy.
Both were heavy supporters of de Gaulle and were referred to
as German Gaullists, though lately a certain disillusionment
has become apparent because of de Gaulle's tactics. Strauss,
nonetheless, still believes in an independent European
9defense as does de Gaulle, but on a supranational basis. "^
"Multilateral Force or Farce?", The New York Times
Magazine, December 13, 1964.
2
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V(est German lonj^-teriu goals can be listed as the
desire for reunification, European unity, and Atlantic
solidarity. MLF was considered to be one device to help
them attain these objectives by creating a close and durable
relationship with the United States. The most pressing-
objective is the reunification of Germany and through the
United States Bonn envisioaed persuading Russia to give up
3East Germany. 'Test European unity might well .tssist in
attracting Eastern Europe as it already has in the economic
sphere, but the trend tov-,'ard unity is likely to be a slow
process becavise of France's disruptive role.
The pressure France has maintained against Germany
has had a divisive effect on unity as well as Germ.an support
for IILF . De Gaulle's tactics appear to be almost forcing
Chancellor Erhard to choose sides between the United States
and France. There is no doubt, that if it came to a shov/-
down, at this time, Germany v.ould choose the United States.
By agreeing to the gi'ain issue in the Common r.Iarliet, and in
conducting lengthy discussions v/ith France, Germany has
attempted to hold Franco-American relations together, but
de Gaulle continues to keep relations strained. In 19u5,
French moves tov/ard Russia and the East certainly alarmed
Gerhard Schrodex', "Germany Looks at Eastern Europe,"
Foreign Affairs, XLIV (October, 1035), 19. "No Ger.Tian govern-
man c , cons ci cu cionally s-ivorn a.s it is to act on behalf of.





SoviGL Foreign Minister Gromyko's statements on
departing- Paris at the end of April, 19G5, implied that
France raight recognirie East Germany. Althoug'i the French
Foreign Ministry corrected the implication b^- stating that
France did not intend to recognize East Germany, German
fears have probably not been allayed; especially \vhen. chis
is coupled with de Gaulle's feeliags and pronouncements that
the German problem is a European problem. Consequently,
Chancellor Erhard v.ho faced elections in September, IJCo,
asked do Gaulle to move ahead his scheduled visit in June
of that year. lie undoubtedly requested assurances on France's
policies tovrard both the Soviet Union and Germany.^ The
visit v;as advanced in an obv'ious move by de Gaulle to alter
the deteriorating Franco-German relations. Germany, after
all, covild turn to the United States and Gx^eat Britain for
greater support, and this v;as not in de Gaulle's interest.
Prime Minister V'ilson's visit to ^-'es t Germany in
March, 19G5, reaffirmed Britain's comiaitment to the security
of Berlin. V,'ilson stated that negotiations on the Liulti-
lateral force would continue at the Paris working gz^oup
level. The Prime Minister affirmed that it was "important
5to try to maintain momentum" on this project. Although
'The '.ashmgton Post, May 11, 1965.
5
Ibid., March 10, 1965.
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Gerinany favors an f.ILF coacept aacl Dritain an AN? project,
both countries appeared to be v/illing to v/ork on a conproiaise
solut. ion
.
Germany continues to build its overall atrenyth, and
is the principal European contributor to NATO's conventional
military posture, but someday its lack of real participation
in nuclear weapons will have to be solved. One need only
return to the inter-v/ar period to realize that Ger:uany cannot
be held as a second-class power or junior partner in relation
to France and Great Britain. France has opposed any German
participation in a NATO nuclear force for obvious reasons.
The reasoning goes that membership would impede European
political unity, thus preventing a European force-"at least
in de Gaulle's eyes, this is probably very true. In support
of this thesis, both Henry Kissinger and Alastair Buchan,
noted authors on NAPO and nuclear strategy, have voiced the
opinion that the reason the United States campaigned so hard




The French idea of a European force v/hich has never
clearly been outlined, except that it would be under French
leadership and her allies would contribute financial and
Alastair Buchan, The Multilateral Force: An
Historical Perspective (LonaoTTi fhe InstiTute f or~otrategic
Stuaios" j^delphi Papers, iNunber Thirteen, October 1964),
p. 11; Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New York
Mc Graw-Hill Book Company, lyoSj^ p^ rZo".
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industrial support, has not provided much attraction for ^.est
Germany. This idea simply shifts the country's position out
from under American leadership to under French domination
and gives Germany less power in the process. The plan might
fit into de Gaulle's vision of a "liluropG from the Atlantic
to the Urals," but it offers less to Germany than her
present association v/ith NATO and close ties to the
United States
.
Yet Germany must rely on cooperation v/ith both States,
French policies have made this a difficult task. Germany
must rely on the Atlantic Alliance and the American deterrent
In Europe she relies on France as a European neighbor, ally
and supplier of agricultural needs, but she cannot afford to
rely on an independent national force of France. For in
xHaymond Aron's v/ords : "In the next fifteen years no
.independent national deterrent will have a security value
equal to the presence of American troops oa European soil and
to the strength of the American commitinent that results from
7
it."
The Federal Republic of Germany which has been a
strong supporter of European unification and greater
integration within the Atlantic Alliance has received the
following and similar pronouncements from V,ashington witi^
7
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Vi'e in V/ashington have learned how pov/erfully the
nuclear problem shapes political attitudes v/ithin nations
and among nations. We think further fragmentation of
our nuclear capabilities and policies will weaken the
Alliance and its foundations. Or the other hand, v/e are
confident that a decision to go forv/ard with the MLF v.'ill
sex've as the basis for greater unity in the Alliance,
not merely in the field of military policy itself but in
the field of arias control and in other areas.
Nations joined in an integrated nuclear venture are
bound to be drawn closer together in ways that none of
us can now fully forsee. They will have to det-^rmine
common positions on arms control negotiations affecting
this venture; they v/ill be tal:ing part in such negotia-
tions as countries v/ith a tangible stake in the outcome,
not as bystanders. They v^ill have to consult closely
about the conditions under which the force would be
placed in a staxe of alert or used, and this will
inevitably involve them in intimate consultation about a
variety of political situations, which bear upon the
availability or use of nuclear weapons.
In short, in deciding whether to go forward with the
IILF we are deciding not merely hov; to share nuclear power;
we are taking decisions which will influence the future
political organization of the T/est. Vr"e are choosing
betv.-een national approaches and a new step tovv'ard integra-
tion in the deepest sense of the word.^
One of the main objects in the IILF approach was the
desire of the United States to seek to discourage national
nuclear forces and avoid proliferation with the reasoning,
this did not add to collective defense. This logic has been
accepted by 7rest Germany. In Foreign Affairs, Fritz Erler
has written:
o
W.W. Rostow, "Europe and the Atlantic Alliance,
address before the Assembly of V.estern European Union,
June 24, 1964, United States Department ox State Press
Release No. 292, p. 6.

66
It has been a Y^estera aim to avoid the proliferation
of nuclear weapons. The British attempt to give up its
existing nuclear arsenal must therefore be welcomed, but
it makes sense only if we replace national by comiiiunity
solutions. The French example would lead to nuclear
weapons for everybody. No responsible German wants
national nuclear weapons for Germany; but in a world
where every nation v/ould have them, it would be impossi-
ble to exclude forever one country" alone without creating
feelings of frustration that would lead to violent
nationalisi.i. Therefore Germany advocates a community
solution within the Alliance. For years I have urged
that the European partiiers in NATO be given a share in
planning, in deciding on common strategy, in preparing
future weapons developments and similar matters, leaving
the ultima ce decision on the use of nuclear weapons in
the hands of the President of the United States, acting
as trustee for the alliance but basing his decision on
a commonly agreed strategy. The Multilateral Nuclear
Force v.as a second-best alterziative to the simpler
soUition of giving every partner in NATO--provic'.ed he
is making a fair contribution to the con/entional field
—
a say in the nuclear part of the strategy too. Since no
government tool: up this proposal, the liL7 , with its
features of common ownership and fin.ancing was a step in
the right direction. A community solution might take
other forms, but any solution must serve the community
axid not be simply bilateral. If Europe achie/es
unification, its participation in the common defense
could be integrated w^ith that of the United States; but
it could not replace it.
Great Britain
The British position also favors a community approach
to the nuclear probleia v/ithin 2-IATO . One of the main themes
that resulted from the talks betwecii Prime Minister Vilson
and President Johnson in December, 1564, was an agreei.ient to
develop strength through unity in nuclear defense. At this
meeting, the British obviously offered to assume or agreed
to take the initiative in aLtem.pting to solve the nuclear
9
Fritz Erler, "The Alliance and the Future of Germany,
Foreign Affairs, XLIII (April, 1965),
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issue. Prench hostility to the MLF had becoino extreme causing
Franco-Gerriian relations as v.'ell as Franco-American relations
to reach new lows. At this point, President Johnson and
Prime Minister Y/ilson nust have thought a shift in leader-
ship regarding nuclear plans Might improve the situation.
In spite of this, the conuaunique that was issued appeared to
leave the door open on any plan that would seive the legiti-
mate interest of the members of the Alliaiice as long as it
prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons and contained
. ^ . P , 10existing safeguards.
The United States envisioned the British plan (ANF) as
Britain's contribution to an enlarged MLF concept and as a
means of erasing her independent force as pledged by the
Labor Party prior to the election of 19 64. The British
position also included an insistance on a continued United
States veto and a clause in a treaty commitment for
participating members not to acquire national atomic weapons.
Great Britain's proposal would accomplish a number of
important purposes. One, Britain would retain its traditional
balance of power role in European affairs. By contributing
part of its existing V-Bombers and to-be-built Polaris
submarines, Germany's major role and dominance would be offset.
1 r^
The Vi'ashington Post, December 9, 1964. Text of Joint
communique
11
Ibid., December 12, 1964.
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Second, the cost of participation by this contribution would
be much lower than in joinin^^ the new proposed fleet. Third,
the Labor Government, by getting rid of its national nuclear
force, might satisfy its ant i- nuclear opponents and the
political "ban the bomb" element. Fourth, ever since
de Gaulle's veto of British membership in the Common Market,
Great Britain has been looking off and on at some way of
forming a closer relationship v/ith the Continent.
Thus, the British interest in MLF/AIT? appeared to bo
m-ilitary, political, and financial. British participation
in the MLF would create a tie to the continent that both
Great Britain and the United States think is necessary to
lay a basis for f\.irther political unity and cooperation.
Prime Minister ^7ilson's visit to V.est Germany in
March of 1955 along with the Queen's visit in May v/ere both
indications that Great Britain wanted an eventual close tie
to Europe and both trips undoubtedly softened a traditional
anti-German image of the Labor Party.
The British position in supporting an ANF proposal
was partly influenced by economic considerations. Existing
forces v/ould be cheaper, and Britain insisted on a clause
permitting temporary withdrawal in case of an emergency east
of Suez. If temporary withdrawal is not permitted then
probably the British government would reserve portions of its
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19Bomber Command from assignment to NATO. The ANF then
envisioned using existing forces which v/ere to be assigned
to NATO control with safeguards on a mixed-manned basis in
the control system, rather than in the forces.
British policy vis-a- vis NATO has been to increase its
strength and tie Great Britain as well as the United States
to Sux'ope in a greater relationship, rather than in a lesser
role ^yhich Fraiice proposes. As a matter of fact, the
political backing that v;ilson has given the United States in
regards to Viet iNam is unprecedented for a Labor Government.
But of course, Britain is committed to the defense of
Malaysia, which would probably come under undue pressure if
the United States abandoned Southeast Asia. Primarily,
though, Great Britain is desirious of maintaining its
"special relationship" with the United States.
Though nilson stated the prospects for an Atlantic
Nuclear Force looked good after his visit to Germany in
March of 1965, progress v/as slow. "^ Nonetheless, the Prime
Minister was convinced there can be no effective independent
nuclear power outside the United States and the So/iet Union.
In an opening address at the NA.TO Foreign Ministers'
Conference in London in May, 1955, V/ilson reaffirmed the
12
Sir John Slessor "Atlantic Nuclear Policy," The
Atlantic Conriunity (Quarterly, III (Spring, 1965), 61-62
.
13
The Y-'ashington Post, March 7, 1965.
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need for the Alliance and stated, "... no nation, hov/ever
great, can think in teriris of going it alone, without allies
14
and without regard to world opinion."
Soviet Union
Soviet opposition to the MLF appears to take two
predominant forms. First, they claim it would open the way
to German acquisition of nuclear weapons. Second, they
stress it would set in motion the process of nuclear
proliferation.
The first theme is aimed at an emotional appeal to
tho^e countries that fear a strong and powerful Gerinany. By
raising anti-German feelings, the Kremlin hoped to create
enough opposition to defeat iMLF. In stressing the nuclear
proliferation thesis, they hoped to play world opinion
against the United States. This line also gives the Soviet
Union an excuse on disarmament talks or a strengthened
bargaining position by claiming MLF would com.plicate diarama-
ment talks
.
As the plans and talks on MLF increased throughout
196-1, Soviet opposition increased and became more threatenixig,
The Soviet Union sent a note to tne United States on July 11,
1964, threatening "... severe and perhaps irreparable
^""'ibid.
,
May 11, 19 o5.
15Zbigniew Brzezinski , "Moscow and the MLF: Hostility
and Ambivalence", Foreign Affairs, XLIII (October, 196i), 126.
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consequences." la Novenber, Iv'obcov/ v/arnod it would take
couateriiieasures to insure the security of the Comi.iunist
world if the projected multilateral force v/as set up. In
lollov/inj their general theme, the statement descx'ibed the
ML? as a bid by V.'es t Geriiian '^vevQws^G: seekers" to gain access
to nuclear weapons and declared it would bo "... blindness
not to see that additional obstacles would appear to dis-
17
armament '^vhich v.'ould bo difficult to overcome ..."
In an appeal to world opi;\ion on Deceriber 7, 1964,
Soviet Foreign Llinister Gromyko introduced a raemorandum
before the United Nations on disarinaiaent callin;^- for
".
. . prevention of such further proliferation of nuclear
weapons as the :,!LF would bring." ^ A week later Polish
Foreign Minister Pwapacki, in a polichy speech before the U.N.
General Asseiably, declared MLF, "... would upset the
equilibrium between the t^»•o sides— if not necessarily the
military balance, then decisively the political onQ .'' He
went on to voice a vague threat by stating, "... no one
can expect that the Socialist countries could then refrain
from tak.ing appropriate counten.ieasures . "
16
Ibid . For the U.S. answer see "U.S. Reaffirms
Position on iv\TO Multilateral Nuclear Force," Tiie Department
of State Bulletin, LI (September 14, lii64)
,
ooT^o"!
' Tne V'ashingcon Post, November 15, liJl»4.
lo
Ibid., December 3, 1964.
^^Ibid., December 15, 1964.
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The Soviet motives for defeat iaj the MLF can be
clearly seen in historical context. Russia has a traditional
fear of a mighty Germany. In Vj'orld T/ar I and in Viorld V.'ar II
she lost millions of her populace to Germany; naturally tiien,
anything that would increase Geriaan pov.er would be against
her interests. Any developiaCnt in V/estern unity, which
the Soviet lliiion recognizes MLF v/ould be, is not within the
wishes of Eastern Europe. Foreign Minister ilapacki made this
point very clear in his pronouncement.
On the other hand, the Soviets must realize that a
defeat for MLF could mean a campaign by '..est Germany for its
own nuclear force or an alignment with France in a Franco-
German nuclear power bloc. The defeat of the EDC in 195':!,
with the immediate rearmament of V,es t Germany to fill the
power vacuum, is an excellent example of what might happen •
in the future. ^^
Thus, the Soviet Union is placed in an unusual
position. The defeat of MLF might create a Franco-German
nuclear force or an independent German force in proximity.
On the other hand, if J.ILF were to go through, it would help
to create V;estern unity which would be a competitor power
bloc even stronger than the present NATO. Yiith Moscov/ in
this, posit ion , it would appear unlikely that any agreement
to MLF would create any serious confrontation, and the
Brzezinski, op. cit., 133.
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vague threats that have been made are without a stronf];
basis, thoy might veil be only a propaganda device. The
very fact that there is strong Soviet opposition can be
interpreted to mean that Moscow sees the MLF as a strong and
credible deterrent.
After the United States' open campaign for :,ILF was
dropped suddenly in December, 19G4, the Soviet Union's anti-
WLF declarations subsided. On January 24, 1J&5, Pravda
announced that NATO powers "including \7est Germany are
21losing interest in the idea." vrhether this view is held by
Soviet officials is hard to say. But it made an excellent
propaganda tool for Russia to use on East Europe's easily
stirred fears of Germany. In this manner, the Soviet Union
could assume the role of protector in attempts to regain
lost influence in Eastern Europe.
Even neutral Finland was apparently pressured into
making a statement against xMLF . At the end of February,
1965, on a visit to Moscow, the Finnish President said that
Finns "cannot help considering" the Soviet Union's outlook on
22the MLF; then he announced that the MLF "plans worry us."
Of course, the Soviet Union's rapprochement with
France will be utilized to the fullest in the future to




The vrashington Post, January 25, 1965.
^^Ibid., February 23, 19G5.
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nuclear coatrol in NATO. French independence v/ill be
encouraged in hopes that France will pull out of the
Alliance completely, thus further v/eakening IVestern defense.
Each has given the other support in the United Nations on
the financial issue, and together they oppose United States
actions in Viet Nam as they did the Dominican Republic.
Therefore, there is good reasoii to believe Paris and Moscow
would join in strong opposition to any future ilLlVANF plans.

CHAPTER VI
THE CENTRAL PaOBLEH—NUCLEAR CONTROL
Separate National Security Interes ts and Strategy
Besides the basic matter of keeping the Alliance
together j the issue of control of nuclear v/eapcns is probably
the greatest problem facing NATO today. Because NATO is an
alliance of sovereign states who want to maintain control
over their separate destinies, the problem is not only
central, but extremely difficult to solve. A basic conflict
of interest and difference in geographic location creates a
lack of strategic consensus (consensus on alliance strategy)
which lies at the base of the problem of nuclear control.
The United States strategy of "flexible respon.^^e" is
by no means wholly accepted by Europeans. The American
strategy is envisioned by Europeans as allowing a conven-
tional war to be conducted on their territory with the
nuclear option withheld until absolutely needed— an option
they have no control over. Once the nuclear option is
utilized, they can visualize a limited nuclear war being
conducted in their dense territory; the resulting destruct-
ion, they feel, would be as great as a total nuclear war,
while the United States and Russia possibly remain privileged
sanctuaries. Thus, Europeans tend to favor a massive
retaliation strategy as more in their interest, but even
here each country has a different concept.

7G
Germany, as a forward line country nearest to the
threat, favors a forv/ard strategy v,ith an immediate response
at the border with tactical nuclear v/eapons. As Kai-Uv,e von
Hassel, the Vi'est German Defense Minister, said in January,
19G5:
The concept of fle^'^b^.e rosnonse in Europe— both po-
litical and military—must not be interpreted to mean
that the so-called atomic threshold can be raised unduly
hi^h, without reference to political considerations.
Apart from the fact that this would lead the potential
aggressor to think that he could calculate his risk, it
v;ould create a situation in v.hich he could seize pavv'os
for future negotiations.
In order to prevent this, atomic demolition mines,
nuclear air defease weapons and, if need be, nuclear
battlefield weapons must be made ready for employment
in an early phase of a recognizable attack, on Europe.
Germany, as noted earlier, considers r.ILF both
2
"militarily useful and politically extremely valuable."
Here Germany wants a say in the control of nuclear weapons
without national ov/nership and feels a coiamunity solution will
accomplish this purpose.
France of course is completely opposed to this view.
French strategy x'ules out relying on conventional defense
with a nuclear back-up. Imiiiediate massive retaliation is
seen as the only alternative to Sov'iet aggression. Even
tactical nuclear warfare is discarded on the grounds that
Kai-Uv.'e von Hassel, "Organizing '.Vestern Defense,"
Foreig.n Affairs
,






even iX invasion v;ere prevented, "... it could not protect
3the Europeans from destruction." The force de frappe, v/hich
is designed to support i-'rencli strategy, is tar^^e ted in a
counter-city role because it is felt the only objectives
that have a deterrent value are deiiographic. Thou--h France
points v/ith pride to its nuclear pov;er, she admits that the
force de frappe supports a strategy of "miniiauin deterrence"
by stating-; "The French Governraent is convinced of the
moderating and even discouraging effect that the existence of
a deterrent force, even a small one, must have on the under-
takings of a possible aggressor."^' If this deterrent does
not v/ork then the object is "... to strike the designated
enemy targets within the shortest possible time with nuclear
1 • ,,5explcsi/es . "
Great Britain supports United vStates strategy, except,
that generally the vie^y is held, that once even tactical
nuclear weapons are used, escalation to all-out nuclear war
will occur. The United States strategy of "graduated
response" calls for nuclear v/eapons being used in a controlled
Carl Anne, "Nuclear Control and the Multilateral
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and selected manner once the decision is reached Lo utilize
the nuclear option. "The British believe that early atomic
blows are needed to resist Russia and any use of nuclear
weapons would make escalation to general war 'virtually
unavoidable ' . "
^
The Labor Government sees little value in maintaining
an independent deterrent which has proved expensive and not
much of a deterrent. Defense Minister Denis liealy has said:
To maintain the fiction of an independent British
deterrent is undermining the solidarity of NATO ....
It decreases America's readiness to trust in Europe and
Europe's readiness to trust in the United States....'''
Thus Great Britain is a supporter of soiiie form of
nuclear control v/ithin NATO. As noted earlier, their
proposal involves the concept of national forces within an
Atlantic Nuclear Force. As a strong supporter of NATO
providing for common defense, Great Britain feels, as does
the United States, that there exists a real need to come up
v/ith a solution to the nuclear control problem.
It can be seen that just amongst four pov/ers, three of
which are nuclear, there is a different outlook on strategy.
This makes solutions to the control problem extremely
difficult. A strategic consensus might never be achieved.
Y/hat is important is that the unity of NATO be maintained





because, as Sir John Slessoi- has said, "United, the
Communists can never defeat us; divided we bid fail- to defeat
ourselves." In the final analysis the unity and strength
of NATO is the strongest bulwark in existence against the
expansion of C cmmu n i s t p owe r
.
The xMLF concept was an attempt by the United States to
create a system that would provide for the needed close
association of Alliens in the planning, decision-making, and
implementation of nuclear policy vvithin a NATO context. At
least MLF was an attempt in the right direction. Steps are
needed to achieve a closer unity in the Atlantic Alliance.
If NATO is allov/ed to disincegrace because of narrow
nationalism on both sides of the Atlantic, then this would
be a major political and military loss not only to the
national security of the United States, but to the 'Test as a
whole. None other than the Soviet Union would be more
pleased, since this lias been their object--to underm.ine and
divide NATO at every opportunity. Division v;ill cause a
weakness in power and to supplement this weakness nations
will turn automatically to a greater source of might and
prestige— nuclear weapons.
Proliferation— The Nth Countr y Problem
There appears to be a general international consensus
against the proliferation of nuclear weapons as evidenced by
^Sir John Slessor, "Atlantic Nuclear Policy," Th(
Atlantic Community ''^uarterly. III (Spring, 1965), 57

80
the sixty-six nation 1953 United Nations General Assembly
Resolution. It asks that "the pov/ers producins nvicloar
weapons .. .refrain from handing over the control of such
9
weapons to any nation not possessing them." This inter-
national consensus is further expressed in the Nvidespread
forn:al adherence to the Test Ban Treaty, (excepting France
and China) . Despite such an international consensus there
is still the possibility of nations aspiring to gain the
status of the "Nuclear Club."
The United States is opposed to the further spread of
nuclear v/eapons to pov/ers not possessing them and is
especially opposed to any independent nuclear forces within
NATO. There are at least some three dozen countries in the
world that are conducting nuclear energy programs. Vithin
NATO, there are at least four countries which have the
capability to produce nuclear weapons v/ith their own
resources—-Canada, Belgium, Italy, and Vest Gerraan.y. Denmark
and the Netherlands are probably very close to having a
similar capability. It is only necessary to look at the
progress of France and China to realize how the attainr.ent of
nuclear pov/er can be achieved.
^Raymond H. Dawson, "Y.'hat Kind of NATO Nuclear Force,"
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science , CCUbl (TTanuary , rDoTJ"^ o2
.
Helmut Schmidt, Defense or xie taliat ion : A German
View, trans. Edward Thom"as (New Yorlcl Praeger , l^oYJ"^ pT 40.
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In exaiiiining the reasons for the proliferation of
nuclear weapons, one must understand the mot iva tin;^" factors
which have • encouraged states to undertake the expensive
effort necessary to create an independent nuclear force.
Among those motivating pressures, in regards to NATO, are
found two major problem areas: lack of consensus on alliance
strategy and doubts as to the credibility of the United States
ee
.
In addition, there is the motivation of status and
international prestige, especially in relation to the other
nuclear powers. As George Liska has written:
National control over a nuclear asset strengthens a
cou'.itry's position in cold-war diplomacy. It increases
the likelihood of the country's' inclusion and strengthens
its voice in serious negotiations. And it increases ils
ability to frustrate separate negotiat ions . '^'•
Further, there is a definite desire to be in on the
vital decisions concerning the use of such weapons. Britaia's
special status is an example which tends to indicate that
possessing nuclear weapons will assure a voice in critical
decisions. These tr.en appear to be some of tne major
pressures causing nations to seek an independent force: the
desire for a part in decisions, planning, negotiations, and
absolute control over weaporis of mass destruction. After
all, "...NATO is an Alliance of sovereign states who want to
George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of





maiiitain control over their individual destinies
Vihat was MLF deoii^ned to do to forestall further
proliferation of nuclear v/eapons v/ithiu. NATO? Gerard Smith,
Y/ho headed up the otate Dopartiueut 's IILF office, until it
was disbanded, felt that I.ILF would bring about closer
iatesration \vithin the Alliance ia the strategic nuclear
TO
area and thus dam.pen eathusian for national forces.
In turning to the question of credibility as it
affects proliferation, a basic conflict develops and it is a
problem that v,ill be difficult to solve. The probleii is: A
credible force adequate in the eyes of V.'estern Europe requires
proliferation in the forui of reconst i tu tin;;; NATO as a nuclear
power in its own right. Any force which is not credible in
the eyes of the Europeans finds difficulty matching the
appeal of an independent nuclear lox'ce. This is the dilenina
in setting up a control mechanism which will discourage
proliferation in the form of national independent forces,
but which, at the same time, is not a form of proliferation
itself— a point the Soviets ne/er fail to bring up.
The particularly peculiar situation of Y/'est Germany
must be investigated before concluding. It is with regard to
Viest Germany that European governm.ents are most fearful of
12
Arame , loc . cit
"^G. C. Smith, "problems of Foreign Policy in Connect-
ion with the Nuclear Defense of Nato," Department of State,
press release, I^o. 17 y (April 22, 1964), p. 12.
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nuclear proliferation. The Soviet Union and the Eastern
European nations are especially sensitive to any control
over nuclear weapons by the V.'est German Government. This
also, undoubtedly is one of the reasons de Gaulle is so
adaiiiantly against MLF. Regardless of the way one approaches
MLF, it appears primarily directed at giving some semblance
oi co!iLrol over nuclear forces and influence in nuclear
policy to the Gorman Federal Republic. It is assumed V/'est
Germany is desirous of such control and influence, though
there is considerable debate as to whether there is German
interest in an independent force, and if so, to what extent.
In this regard, Alastair Buchaa has attacked the foundations
of the MLF concept by writing:
iMoreover, the scheme seems to me to be animated by a
false hypothesis, namely that Germany will decide to
become an independent nuclear power unless she shortly
acquires soip.e share in the physical control of nuclear
weapons. Such a fear, which overlooks the formidable
technical, legal, and political difficulties which would
confront Germany in making such a decision rests on
American misreading of German apprehension and require-
ments. ^"^
Nonetheless, although Germany has adhered to the
treaty provisions forbidding the development of nuclear
weapons, there is no guarantee that a futvire German govern-
ment will forego the power and prestige such v/eapons afford.
Presently, Germany is left with the alternatives of turning
East, or to France, or to the United States, and all three
14
Alastair Buchan, "NATO Divided," The New Republic,
CXLVII (December 29, lJp2) , 15.
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policies have serious overtones. There is also the possibi-
lity of seeking diplomatic solutions within the international
system which is itself under transf orma Lion . But hei" course
today is to rely on the United States and NATO, then hope
through a cop.cept such as mLF to f;ain greater control in
planning, policy, and strate;^y. This maneuver, ho-,Yever,
might well reduce chances at Gerraan unification. Soicethiug,
after all, is going to have to be given up to Russia in
order to regain East Germany. Though possibly not represent-
ative of Germany at large, Gerhard Schroeder, the Foreign
Minister has v/ritten: "the growing impatience of the German
people '.vith the continued partition of Germany is finding
increasing political expression." Recognizing the diffi-
culties the MLF/ANF project has iiad , combined with the
United States commitment in South East Asia, German foreign
policy might well turn to pursue other more pressing problemxS
while awaiting a solution, or seek further the diplomatic
approach.
Having exam.ined the MLF/ANF response and reaction to
some of the problem areas in NAxTO up to the beginning of
1966, it is now necessary to up-date the information and
examine relations in the time frame to July, 1966.
J K
"^•^Gerhard Schroder, "Germany Looks at Eastern Europe,




The most signiiicr.nt event during the first half of
1966 has been the increased divergence between French and
United States relations with respect to NATO. Though fore-
cast by many and forewarned by de Gaulle, France's break
with NATO was not expected so suddenly, nor so soon. No
single occurrence within the Atlantic comiimnity had more far
reaching implications than this independent action by France.
Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman of the Subcommittee
on National Security and International Operations, v/rote in
February, 1966, that the North Atlantic area is still the
decisive area and it needs our national attention."
".
. . The hopes of the world for peace with freedom continue
to depend chiefly on a strong, and confident Atlantic
Community....' But how much confidence can NATO have now
that one of its most important members of vital geographic
importance will completely withdrav'/ militarily from the
organisation yet remain a mem.ber to the Alliance? The
answer to this will depend in large part on American leader-
ship in close cooperation v/ith Great Britain, V/est Germany
United States Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on
National Security and International Operations, The Atlantic
Alliance Basic Issues, o9th Congress, 2d Session~j pursuant
to S . 7iQs~. ToT
,




and the remaininj^ fourteen Allies. Though the French ino\^e
has alienated the Allies, and as the Jackson Subcomi.-iit tee
has stated, "it inay become necessary to revise and reduce
the American commitment to the defense oi" France," the
policy now must be to rr.aJ.e the best of the situation.'^ The
appropriate policy, rather than creating an irretrievable
gap, should be to leave an opeain:^ for France to return.
This policy would be similar to the stated position made
with respect to the MLF/AN? scherae. For, "if the key
Atlantic allies move ahead together on the urg-ent issues
—
as they have the right and duty to do so-— sober second
thoughts may in time prevail in th.e great and ancient French
nation. ""^
All of the attention in NATO is focused on the present
difficulties of the French withdrawal and, though an urgent
issue, the nuclear force question has been sidestepped, at
least for the time being. How long can this continue is a
good question for the nuclear problems of the Alliance are
complex and involve inter-allied confidence extensively. In
fact, .many of the current problems stem from and are involved
with the question of nuclear v.eapons and their control. In
this regard, General Norstad, former SAC2UII has testified:
^Ibid
. ,




This whole subject, I noecl not remind you, is one of
great comiDlexity , involving almost every aspect of
relationships between the countries of the Atlantic area
and beyond. -The reunification of Germany and other
internal problems of the Federal Republic, the Franco-
German relationship, the Comuion Market and other
European activities, the position of Britain vis a vis
the Coutin3nc and the United States, the nature of the
ties betv;een the tv/o sides of the Atlantic, the proli-
feration of Y/eapons, negotiations to linit the dan^'er
and des true Live noss of war, the strength and direction
of the Alliance itself— all of these subjects, and more,
influence or are influenced by ansv/ers to the questions:
Kov.- are the strategic resources of IJATO to be organized
and how is control to be exercised?"^*
Not favorably inclined toward an ANF/ML? solution
mainly because of the difficulties ox. creating a new-
strategic force. General Norstad ad/ocates taking a partial
amount of the tactical nuclear weapons already in NATO and
giving the control over theui to a majority rule of a special
NATO Executive Conmittee made up of no inore than five powers.
A control system of this nature over a minimum nu^aber of
Y'/eapons which would do away v/ith the total American veto
would, in General Norstad's opinion, satisfy the legitimate
5
requirements of the Europeans. He feels this would be
".
. . essential to credibility in the use of nuclear
weapons as a defense and deterrent."^
4United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, The Atlantic Alliance, Hearings before
Subcommittee on National becurity ana International Operations,
S9th Congress, 2d Session, :,Iay 5 and 6, 196G, Part 2











If the requirement for greater control is not
settled in a reasonable time, then the dangers of prolifera-
tion might v/ell be the outcome. During the hearings,
Senator Harris made an explicit point of this in referring
to the German issue by stating, "Some of my German friends
indicated that they do not have to have their finger on the
button or have the hardware, but they have to have som^ething
more than they have nov/ if NATO is to stay a viable instru-
7
ment of deterrence." Referring to the French example
General Norstad replied:
Could you as a Minister or Chancellor in the Federal
Republic say that Germany v/ill re:nain dependent upon the
good Y-/ill and understanding of the United States in this
respect, v/hile a nuiaber of other countries are getting
atomic weapons? I do not believe this is a political
reality. I think you have to meet these things, even if
they are soiietimes distasteful, before you get into a
real problem. It is too late at that time, we saw this
with France. I believe that something like this, if it
had been offered, might have worked, and I say only
"might have," and I do not say it ""Aould have." It
might have solved the problem of France.
°
The important point here is to insure that it doesn't
happen to Germany as an alternative due to the lack of a
solution within a NATO context. The inunediate need of the
Alliance may be to regroup in light of the French action,
but the most pressing overall need is a solution to the









A solution to the problem of the control of the
nuclear v/eapons available for use by or on behalf of
NATO could well be the most important single step
towards reducing tensions, eleininating misundarstand-
ings, within NATO. More than that, it would give a
new sense of direction, a new authority to that
organization.
^
To solve the nuclear control problGm within NATO
might well be the most important single step the Alliance
could make. For to do so, might create the cement necessary
to tie the treaty together and forestall the proliferation
of weapons, at least in '7estern Europe. If the Alliance
begins to break up, other states v/ill probably seek the
French i^osition, which states that France requires a nuclear
force to preserve its national security and independence.
Just one year ago, President de Gaulle reiterated his
country's position:
From the viewi:>oint of security, our inderjendence
requires, in the atomic age we live in, that v/e have
the necessary means to deter a possible aggressor our-
selves, but without our allies holding our fate in
their hands. ^^
The French have a strong argument when they claim
that no nation can be independent and be able to defend
itself without nuclear weapons. To France, nuclear pov/er
means national security, national integrity, and above all




•^^Charles de Gaulle, "The Independence of France"
Vital Speeches,. XXXI (June 15, 1935), 515.
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when visualized \yithout the Anerican nuclear urabrolla. A
minimum deterrent such as the First Generation force de
frappe with its 62 Mirage IV bombers has little to offer
against an all out Soviet attack. Its biggest value has
been as a political lever and to act as a triggering device
to insure i\merican response. In a recent world wide
television discussion on nuclear weapons, Pierre Messmer,
the French Defense Minister, elaborated on the value of the
force:
It is certain that if France v/anted to enter into a
war of military conquest her atomic pov/er would be use-
less, but this is not our problem. Our problem is to
defend our territory, to defend our independence and
our freedom. The problem facing a possible aggressor
then is to kno^.v whether his aggression against France
would be advantageous enough to make it worth his while.
If France's atomic force is strong enough to make him
pay dearly for his aggression, it is likely h<^ will
hesitate. This is what we call a deterrent.^
On the other hand, the V/est Germans see the need for
nuclear v/eapons in a NATO context, rather than as an
independent national force. Plere, the Germans want to be
treated as an equal and have a share in the nuclear d3cision-
making in the Alliance. In the same television debate via
satellite, V/est German Defense Minister, Kai-uv/e Von Hassel,
made his statement on German desires:
There is no doubt in case of v/ar be it a nuclear war
or non-nuclear war my country will be the first to be
Fred Freed, "NBC V/hite Paper: Count dov/n to Zero"
(New York: National Broadcasting Company, 1966), I, p. 4.
(Mimeographed transcript of T. V. broadcast Sunday, April 17,
1966, 6:30-7:30, EDT) . .
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attacJied and probably destroyed. For this reason v/e
think it is a legitimate right for. my country to ask
for a participation in nuclear responsibility, in
nnclear sharing. ^^
Franz Joseph Strauss, chairman of the Christian Socialist
Union, v/arned of possible consequences ahead if Germany is
not given a satisfactory role in NATO nuclear decision
making:
I \70uld like to say that v/e have no national
ambitions, to control or command nuclear weapons. Gn
the other hand, I . . . feol during the last election
campaign those of us eiiprossed our view that Germany
or a country cannot be for the long run in the economic
field a giant, in the political field a dv/arf. If
Germany v/ovild suffer discrimination I think, v/e have to
take into consideration an increasing lack of confidence
into NATO, an increasing malaise and a kind of resigna-
tion or a kind of increased national ambitions. -^^
The British Government recognizes the need to share
Alliance responsibility v/ith Germany, but the British
have been explicit in stating they want no German finger on
the nuclear trigger. Patrick Gordon V/alker, former British
Foreign Minister, said:
I think anything to do v/ith nuclear v/eapons involves
dangers, of course. The;/ 're horrible dangerous things,
but here one's got a choice and I think the finding of
some satisfactory form of sharing for Germ.any is so
much the lesser evil because the greater evil would be
this frustration of German nationalism and its
distortion. -'^
Denis Eealey, British Defense Minister, spoke of the
British V bomber force and four of the five Polaris subm.arines
under construction as a possible solution. "... And we





believe that we can use them politically in order to promote
agreement inside the Alliance which will discourage the
further spread of nuclear weapons.
In opposition, and probably well into the future,
both France and Russia are adamantly opposed to any German
ownership or control of her ovm force, or for that matter,
any part in the decision to use any nuclear force. The
Soviet Union has made the above position clear at the Geneva
disarmament talks when presenting its proposal with regard
to a non-proliferation treaty.
The United States is also most desirous of concluding
a non-proliferation treaty, but insists that Germany has the
right to participate in any NATO collective defense arrange-
ment which will never involve national ovmership of nuclear
weapons. Under Secretary of State, George Ball concludes:
".
, . Y/hat I'm suggesting is that the efforts have to go
hand in hand and we can't sacrifice one in order to attain
the other of we'll be defeating our own objectives in the
16
long run." Thus the Geneva talks remain stalemated, and
although the conference reopened in June, the prospects for
a non-proliferation treaty seem remote.
Also remote are concrete proposals to settle the
nuclear question within NATO. The NATO council meeting also
in June, in Brussels, might have been the oj^portunity for the
^^Ibid., I, p. 3. 16 Ibid. , V, p. 2.
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Allies to consult further on NATO's nuclear probleras, but
the conference succeeded only in discussing the issue of
the French decision to v/ithdraw from NATO's integrated conjinand.
The next six months will bo critical for NATO, and
although the United States has its attention deeply involved
in South East Asia, the President has called for new
initiatives to be studied and proposed for the NATO area.
The current Haarings on NATO in both the Senate and House
of Representatives should be helpful. The meetings of the
McNamara Committee formed specifically to delve into nuclear
matters of NATO should have the potential to solve at least
sone of the issues. De Gaulle's trip to Russia r'.ight well
assist in bringing pressure to bear by opening up new
opportunities. The possible forthconsing debate between East
and V/est Germany v/ill have an effect. Rumania is acting in
the V/arsaw Pact in m.any v/ays similar to France in NATO. Due
to the financial burden. Great Britain is reducing its Army
in V/est Germiany. For the same reason, as well as Viet Nam
coiiuiiitments , the United States is under pressure to cut back
in NATO. Rum.ors have also been heard that Russia might with-
draw five of its twenty divisions for a quid pro quo by the
United States. All of these events which are very current
and difficult to analyze are having, and will have, a deep




The revolution of v/orld pov/er v/ith t.he ascendance of
the Soviet Union as a great nuclear pov/er has continued to
make 17estern Europe the most vital security interest of the
United States outside the North Araerican Continent. The
security and harmony of V/estern Europe are indispensable to
America's safety and prosperity. On the other hand, Europe's
very survival is dependent on the United States. As Ions as
there is a common threat to the security of all members of
NATO, and as long as some of those members need support,
then the United States and her Allies can be said to share a
common interest in maintaining the cohesion of the Alliance.
The MLF concept v/as designed by the United States to
give cohesion to the Alliance by replacing the desire of
nations to form or continue v^'ith national independent
nuclear forces. It v/as felt that if control and ownership
of a unified major nuclear force were attained, with a
concomitant say in its planning, operation, and strategy,
then the desire for independent forces would be satisfied.
By participating fully in United States nuclear
strategy, NATO members v/ould then be assured of American will
to protect Europe even at the expense of its ov/n cities. By
working on common strategy together, not only would the
members be assured, but they would develop the responsibility

05
that goes v/ith being a major nuclear pov/er. The strategy of
a "flexible response" v/ith the necessary balance between
nuclear and conventional forces might then be accepted to a
greater degree. The members then would be willing to
contribute an equitable share of the forces and expenses
involved in maintaining mutual defense. In short, it would
mean cooperation in comu-non defense toward a truly deterrent
posture.
The design, it was hoped, would create ri;ajor coopera-
tion in the control of nuclear weapons which would lead to
unified political control throvigh the organization of I.ILF.
The governing body would be a r.-ajor unified political entity
in itself. Cnce unity of control was realized in the Military
realm, it should then lead to further unity within Siirope.
Through I.ILF the United States v/ould be tied to this develop-
ing unity insuring a partnership principle. Under Secretary
Ball emphasized these points in Tloveirber, 19S4 when he .said,
"This multilateral force would, in our judger.crt, further
strengthen the ties that bind the nations of the Atlantic
partnership. It could give a nev/ im.petus to IXiropean
unity." The United States is desirous of. a unified &jrope
that is linked to the United States in partnei^ship, not a
unified third force as de Gaulle envisions. It v/ould be a
-'George V. Ball, "Germany and the Atlantic Partner-




Europe in which the British ware incluclGcl, based on European
and American joint military, political, and economic policies.
President Johnson has explained this concept in the following
manner:
First we must seek to assist in increasing the unity
of Europe as a key to l.'estern strength and a barrier to
resurgent and erosive nationalism.
Second we must all work to multiply in number and
intimacy the tie betv/een North Ari:erica and Europe. For
we shape an Atlantic civilization with an Atlantic
destiny.^
MLF v/as just such an attempted United States policy
to increase unity and tie the Atlantic partnership together.
The result instead was disunity, therefore the vigorous
campaign was dropped in December, 1964. As late as Hay, 1955,
the President alluded to the original idea, but considered
then current policy as allowing Great Britain and the Federal
Republic of Germany to work on alternative solutions such as
American and British Polaris submarines which v/ould be
3
collectively ovmed.
The year, 1935, ended without any progress towards
finding a form.ula for nuclear sharing. The major discussions
between the United States, Great Britain, and the Federal
Republic of Germany, held in December, ended v/ith an agreement
^The Washington Post, December 4, 1954. Text of Presi-
dent Johnson's Georgetov/n University Speech on December 3,
The Nev/ York Times
,
December 23, 1965; The V/ashington
Post , December 16, 1955.
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that, "... arrangements could be v/orked out to assure
the members of the Alliance not having nuclear weapons an
appropriate share in nuclear defense." But the key sentence
in the joint comraunique stated, "The President and Chancellor
agreed that discussions of such arrangements be continued
4between the tv/o countries and with other interested allies."
Thus, the official announced position was to continue to
search for a soliition that v/ill prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons while still allov/ing for an appropriate sharing
principle—in reality, this meant the IILF proposal v/as put
into a state of indefinite suspension v/ith little prospect
of active revival. The fact that the MLF is considered a
"dead issue" has not been categorically stated officially to
date; both Secretary of State, Rusk and Defense Secretary,
McNamara in recent Congressional testimony inferred as much,
but instead stressed the important role of the Special
5Committee (bettor known as the McNamara Committee) . Former
Presidential Adviser McGeorge Bundy was more explicit when
he stated:
Given the concern of the early 1560 's, the United
States was right to support the MLF as a proposal, and
4
The V/ashington Post, December 22, 1985,
5United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, The Atlantic Alliance, Hearings before Sub-
coiamittee on National oecurity and International Operations,
89th Congress, 2d Session, June 16, 1936, Part 5 (V/ashington:
Governi^ent Printing Office, 1955), pp. 161-62; Ibid . , Jvne 21,
1936, Part 6, pp. 207-09.
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equally ri^jht not to press it home as a proof of
"leadership." Today it is plain there is no need of
the MLF to reassure the Gernans. V/est Germany is happy
without it. No one else in Europe no\7 supports it.
The I.ILF is now quite clearly out of date, and I am
confident that it will be possible for us to give a
foriiial assurance on this point whenever the Soviet
Governiaeiit is really ready for a treaty of effective
nonproliferation.
^
• The root of the x^roblein of nuclear control lies not
in the failvrB of the L'uropean governjuents to appreciate the
strategy of "flexible response," but in the feeling that the
selection of the nuclear option is not avail-'^.ble to theia.
Each country vie ys strategy as it vitally affects its own
national interest and this is largely colored by geographic
location. A "gradual response" v/hich creates additional
options for the United St.-"\tec, the Europeans feel, reduces
their options, inasiTiuch as, it casts doubt on the availa-
bility of the United States nuclear force. There is no dovbt,
the Europeans v/elcone United States forces because they act
as eztra hostages that strengthen the United States nuclear
coniiaitnent . But tlie support of these forces in a conven-
tional strategy or additions to thera is looked upon in a
different manner. V/estern Europe fears becoiaing a battle-
ground while the United States and the Soviet Union remain
privileged sanctuaries.
6
'Adviser to Two Presidents Looks at Trends in Europe",
U S. News and V/orld Report , LXI (July 4, 1955) , S3, Text
of I.IcGeorge 3undy before txie Senate Foreign Relations
Coiiirriittee, June 20, 196G.
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Thus a consensus on alliance strategy may never be
achieved, but this does not Make it necessary to cojnpletoly
castigate the MLP idea. In the first place, IILJP was not
designed as a first strike v/capon. Its role v/as to be one
of deterrence within American nuclear forces. Its use v/as
not envisioned v/ithout the use of United States nuclear
weapons; therefore, the idea that an American veto made it
less credible did not stand up, at least in the United States
opinion— the iSuropeans, hov/ever, had a different outlook.
V'hat did stand out in the I.ILF concept v/as the fact
tha.t it v/as to provide a force that v/as ov/nod and controlled
by Europeans. Through its governing body, access to Araerican
strategic planning, formulation, and control v/as to be gained
and the Aiierican guarantee assured. By creating a European
force v/hich v/ould give NATO non-nuclear pov/ers a say or
influence in the control over their separate destinies, the
hope was that the need for independent forces would be
satisfied. I.ILF symbolized an impressive nuclear force that
had great military value many times stronger than any
independent force and a great deal less expensive.
But its greatest value v/as seen as tieing the United
States to Europe and Europe to the United States. Granted,
the American veto made the United States a trustee for the
Alliance, but is it not already? MLF was to integrate
American pov/er into the Alliance in a larger way, thus
creating a greater interdependence. If independent national
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forces are allowed to form, the tendency will be to split
the Alliance and no longer will nations seek dependence on
a coiiuion defense which is so necessary in this nuclear ago.
If NATO is allowed to disintegrate because of narrow
nationalism and lack of settling the control issue, it would
be a iiiajor political and iiiilitary loss to the United States
national security, as well as to the '/est. The Soviet Union
would have won a major victory as its purpose has been to
divide NATO whenever possible. Moscov/ realizes only too
well the political and Military value and importance of NATO,
otherwise constant propaganda v/ould not be ifiaintained against
the Alliance. In this regard, the Secretary General of NATO,
Manlio Brosio, addressing the Eleventh NATO Parliamentarians'
Conference, said in part:
They v/ant to divide, and ultir.iately to control Europe;
and they find propaganda about German revp.nchism and an
illusory German threat extremely useful for the purpose.
In this situation tv/o main tasks are incumbent on the
Alliance and \vill continue to be so for a long tim.e to
come. One is to maintain the military balance, which has
deterred and will continue to deter aggression and black-
mail; and the other is to preserve a unity of political
action bet'.vsen the Eiaropean States theiiselvos and
betv/een Svirope, United States and Canada. If it fails
in these, Soviet political i^ianeuvering will in the long
run find a weak spot of v/hich it can take advantage in
order to divide and ultimately to control us.''^
7United States Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on
National Security and International Operations, The Atlantic
Alliance: Allied Com_ment, 89th Congress, 2d Session"^ pursuant




The actions of France have by no rieans contributed to
fuljuilling either of the tv/o rr.ain tasks outlined by the
Secretary General. Acting independently, assuming complete
freedom of action in v/orld affairs, de Gaulle has opened a
serious gap in the military, as v/ell as the political unity
of the Alliance. The question here, ho\yever, is v/hether the
IrlLF proposal assisted de Gaulle in deciding to take some of
the actions he has embarked on. As noted in Chapter Seven,
General Norstad has given the answer that an early solution
to some control of v/eapons might have prevented France from
embarking on an independent national force. It is doubtful
that the MLF v/ould have prevented the force de frappe. The
v/hole concept called for integration and a United States
presence and leadership, at least until l^urope united
—
de Gaulle's policies run in the opposite direction. There
is no doubt, hov/ever, the MLF assisted in causing Franco-
American relations to become strained.
Nonetheless, the HLF was an honest proposal to provide
an alternative to the proliferation of national nuclear forces.
It v/as an attempt to provide NATO Allies with a greater voice
in nuclear strategy v/ith the hope to achieve cohesion v/ithin
the Alliance; instead the reverse effect seems to have been
the case. Today, alliances (both u'est and East) are in the
process of transformation, and the military aspects of NATO
are perceived by many as subordinate to the political.
Because the values placed on NATO by each member of the Alliance
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are in such variance in re3.ation to the conceived Soviet
threat, the MLF in such an environiaent is not seen as very
relevant. Consequently, the Special Committee (McNamara
Committee) has been formed and is searching for v/ays to
solve NATO's nviclear problems by means other than an MLF/
ANF scheme.
Thus, the search continues to keep NATO a bulv/ark of
strength in order to deter any Connnunist ambitions or
probing of weaknesses. The United States position is that
the unilateral reduction of armed force or the dilution of
political solidarity in NATO will upset the balance in
Europe and undermine the basis for new negotiations with
the Communists. The achievement of a secure settlement
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